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Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious 
Asylum Claims After the Enactment of the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
Craig B. Mousin∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fostering liberty and standing with the persecuted, Congress 
enacted the International Religious Freedom Act of 19981 (“IRFA”) 
to counteract renewed and increased assaults on freedom of religion 
throughout the globe.2 IRFA called upon the United States to 
 
∗ DePaul University Ombudsperson and Co-Coordinator Asylum and Immigration 
Legal Clinic DePaul University College of Law. I thank Rukhaya Alikahn, Claudia Valenzuela 
Sarah Lang, and Pragna Shukla for their hard work as research assistants for this article. I am 
also grateful to Professors Sioban Albiol and Gil Gott as well as Susan Schreiber for their 
comments and critiques of this article. This article is based upon a presentation given on 
October 7, 2002, at the Ninth Annual International Law and Religion Symposium: “New 
Impulses in the Interaction of Law and Religion,” held at the J. Reuben Clark Law School of 
Brigham Young University. I thank Cole Durham, Elizabeth Sewell, and all the staff and 
students at the International Center for Law and Religion Studies for their invitation and 
gracious hospitality during the Symposium. 
 1. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6481 (2000) (enacted 27 October 1988). For an overview of 
the IRFA, see Steven Wales, Remembering the Persecuted: An Analysis of the International 
Religious Freedom Act, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 579 (2002); T. Jeremy Gunn, A Preliminary 
Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 BYU L. REV. 
841, which provide extensive discussion of the new provisions establishing an International 
Religious Freedom Commission and an Office of International Religious Freedom headed by 
an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom and requiring an Annual Report 
on International Religious Freedom on the status of religious liberty throughout the world. It 
also provides a procedure for diplomatic initiatives and presidential sanctions for foreign 
nations violating religious freedom including designating nations with particularly severe 
violations as countries of particular concern. This article is limited to IRFA’s reform of asylum 
law and procedures. 
 2. See 22 U.S.C. § 6401(b)(5). 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(4)–(6) provides in pertinent part: 
(4) The right to freedom of religion is under renewed and, in some cases, increasing 
assault in many countries around the world. More than one-half of the world’s 
population lives under regimes that severely restrict or prohibit the freedom of their 
citizens to study, believe, observe, and freely practice the religious faith of their 
choice. Religious believers and communities suffer both government-sponsored and 
government-tolerated violations of their rights to religious freedom. . . . 
(5) Even more abhorrent, religious believers in many countries face such severe and 
violent forms of religious persecution as detention, torture, beatings, forced 
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challenge countries engaging in religious persecution to live up to 
international protections of religion, belief, and conscience.3 As an 
integral part of that policy, Congress also reformed domestic asylum 
law regarding adjudication of asylum claims in the United States 
based on foreign persecution on account of religion.4 Interestingly, 
although IRFA admires the domestic protection of freedom of 
religion that “undergirds the very origin and existence of the United 
States,” it fails to cite the First Amendment as a source of 
protection.5 Instead, Congress specifically recognized religious 
freedom as a fundamental and universal right, listing international 
instruments that protect freedom of belief, religion, and conscience.6 
 
marriage, rape, imprisonment, enslavement, mass resettlement, and death merely for 
the peaceful belief in, change of or practice of their faith. In many countries, 
religious believers are forced to meet secretly, and religious leaders are targeted by 
national security forces and hostile mobs. 
(6) Though not confined to a particular region or regime, religious persecution is 
often particularly widespread, systematic, and heinous under totalitarian 
governments and in countries with militant, politicized religious majorities. 
 3. Id. § 6441(a)(1)(A) (2000) states: 
It shall be the policy of the United States— 
(i) to oppose violations of religious freedom that are or have been engaged in or 
tolerated by the governments of foreign countries; and 
(ii) to promote the right to freedom of religion in those countries . . . . 
 4. In addition to pointing to international instruments as the norms for evaluating 
asylum claims based on the protected ground of religion, Congress required new guidelines for 
use of government interpreters to avoid potential bias and discrimination, ordered studies of 
the effect of expedited removal on asylum claims, established a new ground of inadmissibility 
barring foreign government officials who have engaged in particularly serious violations of 
religious freedom, called for training of Foreign Service Officials who make determinations 
regarding overseas refugee processing, and mandated new training for asylum adjudicators, 
immigration judges, and any immigration officers assigned to the expedited removal process. 
Id. § 6473 (2000). 
 5. Id. § 6401(a)(1) (2000) provides: 
The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the 
United States. Many of our Nation’s founders fled religious persecution abroad, 
cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom. They established 
in law, as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the right to freedom of 
religion. From its birth to this day, the United States has prized this legacy of 
religious freedom and honored this heritage by standing for religious freedom and 
offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution. 
 6. Id. § 6401 (a)(2)–(3) provide: 
(2) Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal human right and 
fundamental freedom articulated in numerous international instruments, including 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the Helsinki Accords, the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the United 
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With reference to those international protections, Congress 
mandated reform of the U.S. asylum laws and directed the Attorney 
General in conjunction with the Secretary of State to train asylum 
officers, immigration judges, and other immigration officials in not 
only these international instruments, but also in the diverse 
manifestations of religion and persecution by both governments and 
non-governmental parties.7 
Critics have accused the United States of attempting to impose 
its understanding of religious liberty upon nations with different 
cultures, histories, and jurisprudence by regulating the relationship 
between government and religion.8 However, Congress did not 
intend to impose United States values upon other nations, but rather 
intended to hold countries to the international religious liberty 
treaties and covenants that they have signed.9 
Less has been written, however, on the impact of interpreting 
international agreements pursuant to domestic asylum adjudication.10 
 
Nations Charter, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
(3) Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship, and observance.”. [sic] Article 18(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that “Everyone shall 
have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching”. [sic] 
Governments have the responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of their 
citizens and to pursue justice for all. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of 
every individual, regardless of race, sex, country, creed, or nationality, and should 
never be arbitrarily abridged by any government. 
 7. See id. § 6473 (a)–(c) (calling for reform of asylum policy); id. § 6471 (requiring 
immigration judges and consular, refugee, and asylum officers to use the Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom “in cases involving claims of persecution on account of 
religion”). 
 8. Dominique DeCherf, Religious Freedom and Foreign Policy: The U.S. 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, at 9 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
BYU Law Review). But see Gunn, supra note 1, at 846. 
 9. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and Abroad: Reflections on 
Protecting This Fundamental Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 413; see also Gunn, supra note 1, at 
846–47. 
 10. Indeed, not only has there been a lack of scholarship, but a search of the electronic 
databases reveal that no court has cited IRFA in the context of a claim for asylum based on 
persecution on account of religion. 
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IRFA requires reevaluation of asylum adjudication on both legal and 
factual grounds. Most significantly, it reveals congressional 
frustration with previous asylum and refugee adjudications. To 
address the problem, it points not to domestic United States law but 
to international declarations and covenants as critical guidelines for 
analyzing violations of religious freedom in the asylum context.11 
Further, it emphasizes not just additional training but also stresses 
specific training “on the internationally recognized right to freedom 
of religion, the nature, activities, and beliefs of different religions, 
and the various aspects and manifestations of violations of religious 
freedom.”12 
This paper proposes that IRFA calls for adjudicating asylum 
claims on account of religion through the lens of international 
agreements, with greater sensitivity to the scope of religious 
persecution in the world. Moreover, this paper maintains that to 
rectify the neglect or bias in earlier administrative screenings and 
adjudications, Congress enacted IRFA to employ international 
protections and guidelines to expand protection against persecution 
for persons of faith or belief. Therefore, attorneys and advocates for 
refugees should raise new legal arguments pursuant to IRFA’s 
engagement of international instruments for determining religious 
persecution claims in asylum cases. Part II describes the parameters 
of domestic asylum law prior to IRFA. Part III raises both the legal 
and cultural issues that make adjudication of religious asylum claims 
difficult and contribute to the bias or to the lack of information cited 
by Congress. Part IV discusses how IRFA’s introduction of 
international law into asylum adjudications and its definitions of 
violations of religious liberty necessitates reevaluating adjudication of 
 
 11. The House Report on IRFA stated: 
The primary impetus behind the immigration provisions of H.R. 2431 is the 
concern that victims of religious persecution may not be treated fairly by the 
organizations and individuals responsible for screening applicants for asylum or 
refugees status and adjudicating their claims. Such unfair treatment could arise from 
improper biases or from lack of proper training.  
H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 3, at 16 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 602, 628. 
Although Congress made significant changes in H.R. 2431 in enacting IRFA, IRFA retained 
the mandate for training and eliminating bias and misunderstanding remains in the final bill. 
See also T. Jeremy Gunn, The United States and the Promotion of Freedom of Religion and Belief, 
in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DESKBOOK (Tore Lindholm et al. 
eds.) (forthcoming 2003). 
 12. 22 U.S.C. § 4028(a)(1); see also id. §4028(a)(2); id. § 6473(a)–(c); Gunn, supra 
note 11. 
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asylum claims on account of religious persecution. Although 
government training has been commenced on IRFA’s impact, no 
asylum decisions have yet cited IRFA. This section suggests four 
areas where IRFA can increase asylum protection. First, IRFA first 
calls for broader comprehension of religious liberty. Second, IRFA 
requires greater sensitivity to the legal and factual issues involved in 
credibility determinations. Third, IRFA expands the understanding 
of religious persecution. Fourth, IRFA recognizes the government’s 
duty to protect against violations of freedom of belief or religion. 
Part V argues that IRFA asks no more of the United States than the 
United States asks of its foreign neighbors. If IRFA calls for foreign 
nations to live up to their international agreements to protect 
freedom of religion, belief, and conscience, it also seeks reformation 
of domestic asylum law to live up to the same international 
commitments it has agreed to with respect to religious liberty, thus, 
requiring the United States to further liberty while standing with the 
persecuted.13 
II. ASYLUM ADJUDICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since 1980, when the Refugee Act14 was enacted, the United 
States has adjudicated numerous claims by refugees seeking safe 
haven and refugee status pursuant to domestic law implementing the 
provisions of the United Nations Protocol for Refugees15 (“Refugee 
Protocol” or “Protocol”). The Protocol, adopted by the United 
States Senate in 1968, took twelve years to become domestic law. 
Under the Refugee Act, persons outside of their nation who have 
been persecuted or who possess a well-founded fear of persecution 
can seek asylum in the United States.16 The Immigration and 
 
 13. See 22 U.S.C. § 6401(b)(5). The Office of International Freedom has stated: “The 
promotion of religious freedom is therefore an international responsibility—one that falls to all 
nations—in which we have agreed to hold each other accountable.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2001), available at 
http://222.state.gov/g/drl/irf/fs/2264.htm. 
 14. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 15. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312(XXII), 22 U.N. GOAR, Supp. 
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). Although the United States participated in the drafting of 
the Convention, it has never signed the Convention. It acceded to the Protocol in 1968 which 
incorporates by reference most of the relevant provisions of the Refugee Convention. See 
DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (3d ed. 1999). 
 16. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158 (2000). 
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Nationality Act (“INA”) requires that the Attorney General set up 
procedures to determine whether individuals fleeing their native 
lands based on allegations of persecution are eligible for a grant of 
asylum.17 The INA defines a refugee as one who is unable or 
unwilling to return to her home country “because of persecution or 
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”18 If past persecution is demonstrated, a presumption arises 
 
 17. United States immigration law actually provides four potential remedies for persons 
who have been suffered from persecution or torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2000) establishes an 
overseas refugee-processing program. Each year the President designates the number of 
refugees and areas of the world that the United States will process and accept as refugees who 
will then enter the United States as asylees. Typically, overseas refugees are not represented by 
attorneys. The administrative process links refugees with volunteer agencies for resettlement in 
the United States. IRFA calls for training of Foreign Service Officials who work in the asylum 
determination program. 22 U.S.C. § 4028 (2000). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(a) (2000) addresses 
the United States’ commitment to the non-refoulement section of the United Nations Refugee 
Convention and Protocol by establishing the requirements for withholding of deportation, 
now called restriction on removal. The United States Supreme Court has determined that 
withholding has a higher burden of proof to determine eligibility, holding that an applicant 
must show a clear probability of persecution rather than the more generous standard of 
well-founded fear. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421 (1987). Although the restriction on removal provision is mandatory for the Attorney 
General, the remedy provides only that the United States will not deport that person to the 
applicant’s native land. The Attorney General can seek to remove the person to any other 
nation if agreement can be reached with another nation. Moreover, the individual is not 
eligible for lawful permanent residence. Finally, individuals who are in danger of being tortured 
or have been tortured may seek independent relief through the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 
1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 1208.17 (2002); see, 
e.g., In re G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366 (BIA 2002). For the most part, except for the burden of 
proof difference and the discretionary determination, asylum and removal of restriction both 
require proof of nexus to one of the enumerated grounds of protection such as religion. This 
article will address IRFA’s impact on asylum primarily, but its discussion of persecution on 
account of religion would be relevant to restriction on removal claims as well. 
 18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). Persons seeking asylum through the Asylum 
Office affirmatively apply for asylum. If they do not obtain a grant of asylum, they may be 
placed in removal proceedings before an immigration judge where they are designated the 
respondent. If they are denied asylum, they have a right of appeal to the administrative appeals 
body, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”). If they do not prevail at the 
Board, they have a right to petition for review in the federal court of appeals whose district 
includes the city where their initial removal hearing was held. For clarity in this article, I will 
refer to the person seeking asylum as “applicant” regardless of the stage of the hearing. 
  In addition, on March 1, 2003, the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) were divided amongst and distributed to several new entities within the 
Department of Homeland Security including the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (BICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Bureau of Citizenship 
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that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution19 
unless conditions in the country from which the applicant fled have 
changed to such an extent “that the applicant no longer has a well-
founded fear of persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality, 
or, if stateless, in the applicant’s country of last habitual 
residence . . . .”20 Even if the presumption is rebutted, an applicant 
may still qualify as a refugee based on past persecution alone if she 
“has demonstrated compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable 
to return to [her country of nationality] arising out of the severity of 
the past persecution.”21 In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court 
held that the “on account of” language in the refugee definition 
requires the applicant to prove either a nexus between the 
persecution or the well-founded fear of persecution and the 
enumerated ground of protection on account of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.22 Finally, even if statutorily eligible, the Attorney General 
must also exercise discretion in determining whether to grant a 
particular applicant asylum.23 Congress has also enacted a number of 
bars that preclude an otherwise eligible asylum applicant from 
receiving a grant based on criminal acts, persecution of others, and 
 
and Immigration Services (BCIS). The Asylum Office and its adjudication of affirmative asylum 
claims will fall within the jurisdiction of BCIS. See This is the BCIS, BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/aboutus/ 
thisisimm/index.htm (last visited May 24, 2003); Welcome to Customs and Border Protection, 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/ 
about/mission/cbp.xml (last visited May 24, 2003); Welcome to Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, at 
http://www.bice.immigration.gov/graphics/index.htm (last visited May 24, 2003). The 
Executive Office for Immigration Review which contains the Office of the Immigration Judge 
and the BIA remain within the Department of Justice. This article refers to the INS and its 
previous role in asylum adjudication and screening, and in producing Training Manuals. The 
article=s discussion of IRFA=s mandate to reform asylum law and procedure will continue to 
apply to asylum adjudicators under BCIS as well as to EOIR within the Department of Justice. 
 19. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2002). 
 20. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (2002). 
 21. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A); see Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 404–05 (7th Cir. 
1997); Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 22. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). In addition, applicants can adduce 
evidence that they have been persecuted on account of one or more of the protected grounds. 
The Board has also stated that they can obtain asylum in mixed-motive cases, where the harm 
is caused by violence against both a protected ground and a non-protected ground. See In re S-
P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (BIA 1996). This article concentrates on issues limited to persecution 
on account of religion. 
 23. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). 
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tardiness in applying for asylum.24 The Refugee Act adopts the 
principles of the Refugee Protocol requiring all asylum adjudications 
be made in a geographical and ideologically neutral manner.25 
Courts, however, face the temptation of ignoring that Refugee 
Act requirement and instead see foreign policy implications of 
asylum decisions. Asylum law, however, seeks not to critique a 
particular country’s human rights record. As the Board of 
Immigration Appeals emphasized: 
It is also important to remember that a grant of political asylum is a 
benefit to an individual under asylum law, not a judgment against 
the country in question. When the international community was 
considering the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the U.N. General 
Assembly made clear that “the grant of asylum by a State is a 
peaceful and humanitarian act and . . . as such, it cannot be 
regarded as unfriendly by any other state.”26  
Despite that noble goal, biases and foreign policy considerations 
have often resulted in the loss of asylum for otherwise bona fide 
refugees. 
III. THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL BARRIERS TO OBTAINING ASYLUM 
Although Congress did not specifically cite every reason for 
asylum reform in IRFA, it did stress the need to eliminate bias in 
interpreting violations of religious freedom. To solve that problem, 
IRFA invoked not the First Amendment, but international 
 
 24. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)–(C); see e.g., Molina-Valladares v. INS, 2003 WL 683593, at 
*1 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2003) (finding applicant ineligible for asylum because he engaged in 
persecution against rebels in Guatemala); Saleh v. INS, 962 F.2d 234, 238–39 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(prosecution for unjustifiable homicide not persecution; bars to asylum enacted in 1990 would 
have made applicant ineligible for relief). 
 25. Earlier United States immigration law had demonstrated just the opposite concerns 
by limiting asylum eligibility both geographically and ideologically, specifically limiting relief to 
citizens of certain Middle Eastern and communist nations. See ANKER, supra note 15, at 2; see 
also Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (“[T]he 
fact that an individual is from a country whose government the United States supports or with 
which it has favorable relations is not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for 
asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution.”). 
 26. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 492 (citing Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra 
note 15, at 81). The Board further noted, “A decision to grant asylum is not an unfriendly act 
precisely because it is not a judgment about the country involved, but a judgment about the 
reasonableness of the applicant’s belief that persecution was based on a protected ground.” Id.; 
see also Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human 
Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179 (1994). 
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instruments to protect against persecution on account of religion. It 
called for greater understanding of international protection of 
religious freedom and greater understanding of how religions 
manifest themselves in many diverse ways.27 Although IRFA does not 
cite the First Amendment of the Constitution, the development of 
asylum law with regard to religious cases prior to 1998 reveals that 
the First Amendment law contributed to diminished protection for 
refugees seeking relief on account of religious persecution. 
A. The Influence of Religion on the Development of Asylum Law 
Persons fleeing religious persecution, although not constituting a 
large percentage of asylum cases, nonetheless have dramatically 
influenced the development of the law. Initially, the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 
Convention”)28 itself came into force under the tragic legacy of the 
persecution of the Jews under the Nazis, providing a legal recourse 
and safe haven for those who physically survived the Holocaust, but 
could not return to Germany.29 Moreover, religion was treated 
differently than the other enumerated grounds during the debate 
over the 1951 Convention. Although one of the five enumerated 
grounds of protection, religion “is the only article in the convention 
where treatment is ‘at least as favorable’ as that accorded to nationals 
of the contracting states is provided for.”30 Thus, a nation’s domestic 
protection of religious liberty establishes a floor for protection of an 
asylum applicant. 
Asylum law calls for adjudication of claims on an individual basis. 
Lawmakers initially anticipated relatively few cases. But several 
historical factors, often precipitated by religious conflicts, resulted in 
large waves of asylum seekers that severely challenged the relatively 
new refugee law. The exodus from Cuba and Haiti had religious 
elements. The escalating violence in Central America following the 
assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero in 
1980, the murder of four North American church women in El 
 
 27. See supra notes 13–14. 
 28. Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 147 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 29. See Tuan N. Samahon, The Religion Clauses and Political Asylum: Religious 
Persecution Claims and the Religious Membership-Conversion Imposter Problem, 88 GEO. L.J. 
2211, 2212 (2000). 
 30. THE REFUGEES CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED 
42–43 (Paul Weis ed., 1995). 
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Salvador, and the civil war in El Salvador all also resulted in great 
numbers of Salvadorans fleeing to the United States.31 Critics 
complained that, notwithstanding the intent of the Refugee Act, the 
United States continued to make decisions based on ideological and 
geographical considerations. Asylum seekers fleeing governments 
allied with the United States frequently failed to obtain asylum. 
Asylum applicants who challenged enemies of the United States 
prevailed in far greater numbers despite similar claims of government 
violence.32 In 1991, the Attorney General settled a national class 
action that had alleged that the United States had discriminated 
against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants. The Attorney 
General agreed to reopen all denied asylum cases filed by Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan natives since the enactment of the Refugee Act in 
1980.33 Initially, the American Baptist Churches lawsuit alleged 
violations of the First Amendment when the federal government had 
prosecuted religious activists who provided public sanctuary and safe 
haven for Central American citizens fleeing the terror of the death 
squads in the 1980s.34 Plaintiff refugee organizations also claimed 
that discriminatory treatment of those Central Americans by asylum 
adjudicators led them to offer public sanctuary in their churches due 
to the failure of the legal process.35 Finally, individual refugee 
 
 31. See, e.g., ANA CARRIGAN, SALVADOR WITNESS: THE LIFE AND CALLING OF JEAN 
DONOVAN 17, 157–58 (1984). The Refugee Act became effective on March 17, 1980. On 
March 23, 1980, Archbishop Romero preached a homily calling for all members of the military 
to lay down their arms and “remember instead the voice of God: ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill!’ God’s 
law must prevail.” Id at 157. On the very next day, Archbishop Romero was assassinated while 
giving a memorial mass. Id. at 158. On December 2, 1980, Ursuline nun Dorothy Kazel, lay 
missionary Jean Donovan, and Maryknoll Sisters Maura Clarke and Ita Ford were murdered in 
El Salvador. Id. at 17–29. 
 32. See, e.g., Carolyn Patty Blum, A Question of Values: Continuing Divergences Between 
U.S. and International Refugee Norms, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 38, 43–44 (1997). Compare 
In re A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1987) (holding that Salvadoran who refused to serve in 
military not persecuted), with In re Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (granting Afghan 
asylum for refusal to serve in the Soviet controlled Afghan army). 
 33. Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(approving settlement agreement reopening all denied asylum cases from 1980 to 1990 based 
on allegations of discrimination against class of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants 
during adjudication of original claims). 
 34. Am. Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 35. Id.; see also IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND 
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES (1985); PENNY LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA—THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
CONFLICT WITH U.S. POLICY (1982). See generally RENNY GOLDEN & MICHAEL 
MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (1986). 
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plaintiffs sought relief from discriminatory treatment of Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan asylum claims.36 The First Amendment claims 
alleging government violations of religious liberty failed, but the 
discrimination claims became part of the settlement known as the 
American Baptist Churches settlement. Consequently, almost 
280,000 asylum applicants were able to reopen their cases and 
reapply for asylum.37 The INS has struggled for over a decade to 
properly process those additional cases as they added to an increasing 
backlog of cases, forcing the INS and Congress to frequently 
consider changing asylum law and procedure to catch up.38 Thus, 
even when the claims were not necessarily based on religion, the 
impact of the American Baptist Churches settlement greatly 
influenced asylum law during the last thirteen years. 
B. First Amendment Religious Jurisprudence and Asylum Law 
Persons fleeing religious persecution and seeking safe haven in 
the United States have carried a daunting burden placed upon them 
by two early 1990 decisions of the United States Supreme Court—
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith39 and INS v. Elias-Zacarias.40 In Smith, Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court, surprised the religious freedom world by 
holding that a neutral, generally applicable law that did not 
intentionally discriminate against religion did not violate the First 
Amendment.41 In Smith, two Native American drug counselors were 
 
 36. Meese, 712 F. Supp. at 766. 
 37. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 3 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.09[2] 
(1996) (reporting that over 240,000 Salvadorans and 40,000 Guatemalans took advantage of 
the settlement). 
 38. See, e.g., Craig Mousin, A Preacher’s Teacher: Lessons on Ministry from One Who 
Proclaims the Word, in THE HONEYCOMB OF THE WORD, INTERPRETING THE PRIMARY 
TESTAMENT WITH ANDRÉ LACOCQUE 104, 116–17 (W. Dow Edgerton ed., 2001) (ABC 
class member still waiting for permanent relief in 2001). 
 39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a critique of adjudication of religious asylum claims, see 
Musalo, supra note 26; Samahon, supra note 29; Eric T. Johnson, Religious Persecution: A 
Viable Basis for Seeking Refugee Status in the United States? 1996 BYU L. REV. 757; Peter 
Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian and Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 
6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135 (1993). 
 40. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
 41. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, in part, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .” For a particularly interesting examination of the politics behind the 
Smith decision raising questions regarding the neutrality of the enforcement of a law of general 
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discharged from their employment for having used peyote while 
participating in their religious services. Otherwise abstaining from all 
drugs and alcohol, these two individuals sought unemployment 
compensation as they had been discharged, not for cause, but in 
violation of their religious freedom. The Supreme Court disagreed 
and upheld the dismissal against this religious freedom claim.42 Prior 
to Smith, if a claimant alleged a violation of their religious liberty by 
government action, the government had to show both a compelling 
interest in the policy or action and that no less restrictive means were 
available.43 
In the face of extensive public and academic outrage at the Smith 
decision, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) to correct what was perceived as the eviscerated 
protection for religious liberty under Smith.44 As its name suggests, 
RFRA restored the earlier test by shifting the burden to the 
government to demonstrate a compelling interest necessitating the 
obstruction of liberty and that no less restrictive means to achieve its 
goal existed.45 In effect, Congress sent a message to the Supreme 
Court that the Congress, not the Court, possessed the correct 
interpretation of the First Amendment—religious liberty is at risk 
from government actions and laws that both intentionally 
discriminate as well as those neutral laws or policies that have the 
effect of restricting religious liberty.46 
In the Court’s very next case involving Smith issues, the Supreme 
Court agreed that the First Amendment protected against 
intentional discrimination.47 Subsequently, however, in City of 
 
applicability, see Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment 
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 (1998). 
 42. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79. 
 43. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 44. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 
(1994); see also Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994), Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. 
Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994); 
Musalo, supra note 26, at 1213. 
 45. Musalo, supra note 26, at 1214. 
 46. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999, 1001 (1990) (comparing formal neutrality which is 
closely akin to equal treatment to substantive neutrality which requires government to 
“minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief disbelief, 
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance”). 
 47. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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Boerne v. Flores, a case involving a historical landmark protection 
regulation that prohibited a Roman Catholic Church from 
expanding its house of worship, the Court held RFRA 
unconstitutional, at least as it applied to the states.48 In City of 
Boerne, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution did not give Congress the power to enact the sweeping 
changes in First Amendment protections that RFRA entailed.49 
Congress returned to the drafting table and passed the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),50 
restoring the pre-Smith test in limited circumstances. But even 
RLUIPA faces an uncertain constitutional future.51 As this battle 
continues to play out at the federal level, lower and administrative 
courts, such as the Board, face increased difficulty in fully 
understanding the parameters of First Amendment protection. 
Indeed, Dominque DeCherf suggests that one reason Congress 
turned to international protections of religious liberty in IRFA was 
because Congress, itself, was uncertain of the scope of protection the 
First Amendment provided after Smith.52 
While Smith and City of Boerne carved out new First Amendment 
law, the Supreme Court was making significant, although remarkably 
similar, changes to asylum law. In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,53 the Court 
held that an indigenous young man from Guatemala who was 
recruited by guerrilla forces failed to meet his burden of proof that 
the guerrillas would persecute him on account of his political 
 
 48. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 49. Id. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2000). 
 51. Fred Gedicks has summarized the bill:  
RLUIPA reinstated the exemption doctrine against federal and state land use 
regulations that burden religious practices, where the burden relates to a program 
that receives federal funds or affects interstate commerce. . . . [Section 2(a)] also 
reinstated the doctrine against governmental action that burdens the religious 
practices of prisoners and other persons in government custody or control. . . . 
Finally, RLUIPA amended RFRA to clarify that the latter remains valid as applied to 
federal action. 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
925, 926 n.5 (2000). Indeed, two courts have already held RLUIPA’s provisions regarding 
prison inmates unconstitutional. See Al Ghashiyah v. Dep’t of Corr., 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 
(E.D. Wis. 2003); Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003). 
 52. DeCherf, supra note 8, at 10. 
 53. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
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opinion.54 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia first held that it was 
the applicant’s political opinion, not that of the alleged persecutor, 
that was relevant for purposes of asylum law.55 The record before the 
Court failed to indicate that the applicant resisted recruitment due to 
his political opposition to the guerrillas, and the Court therefore 
found that “[e]ven a person who supports a guerrilla movement 
might resist recruitment for a variety of reasons—fear of combat, a 
desire to remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a 
better living in civilian life, to mention only a few.”56 But the Court 
held that the applicant bears the burden of proving that the alleged 
persecutor “will persecute him because of that political opinion, 
rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.”57 The Court 
acknowledged that the law did not require direct proof of a 
persecutor’s motives, but the applicant had to provide some evidence 
of motive, “direct or circumstantial.”58 
Professor Karen Musalo points out that Elias-Zacarias shifted 
asylum adjudication away from an effects-based test, which focused 
on the impact of the persecution upon the victim, to an intent-based 
test—the applicant possesses the belief or characteristic found within 
the enumerated grounds and the persecutor intended to persecute 
her on account of that belief—the same shift that Smith produced in 
First Amendment jurisprudence.59 
Subsequently, in Canas-Segovia v. INS,60 the Ninth Circuit 
denied the asylum claims on account of religious persecution of a 
Jehovah’s Witness who refused to serve in the Salvadoran army 
under a universal conscription law.61 Musalo recognized that in the 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 481. 
 56. Id. at 482. 
 57. Id. at 483. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Musalo, supra note 26, at 1181. 
 60. 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 61. Id. The Ninth Circuit refused to hold that religion should be treated differently than 
political opinion for asylum purposes. Nonetheless, it held that the applicant did prove 
persecution on account of an imputed political opinion of opposition to the government and 
therefore granted asylum. Id. at 602. Asylum law permits applicants to claim persecution on 
any of the five enumerated grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). Indicating the 
difficulty of proving persecution on account of religion, some applicants base their claim on 
one of the other categories. See, e.g., In re O-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23 (BIA 1998) (basing claim 
on Jewish nationality rather than religion). In addition, the Board has set forth a standard 
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“metaphorical marriage” of the Smith and Zacarias decisions, the 
asylum applicants lost because they were not being persecuted but 
only prosecuted under a neutral law of general applicability that all 
young Salvadoran men faced.62 The dovetailing of Smith and 
Elias-Zacarias, as seen in Canas-Segovia, has led to numerous denied 
asylum cases, especially forced conscription cases where neutral laws 
of general applicability have oppressed or hindered religious belief or 
practice yet precluded bona fide refugees from relief in the United 
States.63 
C. The Societal Barriers 
In addition to these legal barriers, persons seeking asylum on 
account of religion also face societal barriers that have influenced the 
determination of the extent of harm necessary to constitute 
persecution and the role of religion in modern life. Asylum applicants 
fleeing persecution on account of religion do so in light of shifting 
understandings of religion and the state. When the founders drafted 
the early state constitutions and implemented the federal 
constitution, God and God’s impact on conscience entered into their 
thinking about the laws and why people obeyed them.64 But as the 
Enlightenment began to dominate intellectual life and immigration 
led to greater pluralism, secularization of thought and society 
diminished the role of religion in public life.65 Post-modernism and 
secularism deny a God active in the world’s events or monitoring 
 
when a persecutor may have mixed motives involving a protected ground and a non-protected 
ground. See, e.g., In re S-H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 495 (BIA 1996). 
 62. Musalo, supra note 26, at 1225. 
 63. See, e.g., Sheviakov v. INS, 2 Fed. Appx. 877 (9th Cir. 2001); Tecun-Florian v. INS, 
207 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying asylum to applicant despite persecution for refusing 
to join guerilla army based on Roman Catholic belief prohibiting murder and thus suffering 
torture at the hands of the guerillas); Dobrican v. INS, 77 F.3d 164 (7th Cir. 1996). Where an 
applicant can clearly demonstrate that religion was the basis of the persecution, the Board has 
granted asylum. See, e.g., In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000). 
 64. James M. Washington, The Crisis in the Sanctity of Conscience in American 
Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 11, 28 (1992); see also Craig B. Mousin, State Constitutions 
Within the United States and the Autonomy of Religious Institutions, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: 
A COMPARATIVE SURVEY, 401, 412–15 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001). 
 65. Martin E. Marty, The Widening Gyres of Religion and Law, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 
664–65 (1996); Robert T. Handy, The Voluntary Principle in Religion and Religious Freedom 
in America, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: A STUDY OF GROUPS IN FREE SOCIETIES 127, 
137 (1966). 
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citizen’s lives.66 Laws come from the state, not a deity. Moreover, 
under Establishment Clause doctrine, governments cannot adopt a 
religious purpose or perspective.67 Judges are prohibited from 
defining orthodoxy within a religion or choosing sides between two 
competing groups claiming to be the ones holding the truth for that 
particular religion.68 Some suggest, therefore, that society has lost all 
understanding of religion and even the competency to understand 
it.69 Secularism pigeonholes religion as a private, interior force. But if 
hidden away, its invisibility may preclude accurate understandings of 
the extent violations of freedom of religion or belief may constitute 
religious persecution. Secular minimization of religion may also 
diminish the plausibility of religious claims. This conclusion rings 
especially true when persons of faith from minority or 
non-traditional religions attempt to explain how their faith required 
them to face persecution rather than convert or give up.70 Justice 
Jackson predicted long ago that “When one comes to trial which 
turns on any aspect of religious belief or representation, unbelievers 
among his judges are likely not to understand and are almost certain 
not to believe him.”71 
Yet as society has lost faith in a God of love and grace, society 
has still kept faith with human efforts to maintain order. Whether it 
 
 66. Washington, supra note 64, at 28; see also FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE 
RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE (1995); FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE: JUSTICE AND 
THE REALITY OF GOD 265 (2000). 
 67. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 
(1996). 
 68. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also Watson v. 
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) (“The law knows no heresy, and is committed to 
the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”); Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 
729 (9th Cir. 1996) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“A judge violates the First Amendment when 
he bases his decision not on objective facts but on his personal conclusions as a ‘lay 
theologian.’ Whether a person is a devout member of his church is not for the government to 
decide. It involves religious stereotyping that clouds all rational thinking.”). 
 69. See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION 
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: 
HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
 70. See, e.g., MARTIN E. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC: THE AMERICAN 
CIRCUMSTANCE 74 (1987); see also Mousin, supra note 38, at 112–13. 
 71. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93, (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see Kent 
Greenawalt, Five Questions About Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask, in OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH, RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACIES 196, 203–04 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000). 
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be crime, disorder, or terrorism, United States society has placed an 
inordinate faith in the power of the state to protect citizens from 
harm.72 But, as we seek security, we may turn a blind eye towards the 
violence of the state in our midst. On one level, as Robert Cover has 
pointed out, society gives judges exceptionally violent power.73 The 
legal system authorizes judges to rend families and communities 
through imprisonment.74 Immigration judges reveal the extreme 
power they wield as they can deport and banish from our land 
individuals who may leave behind United States citizen spouses, 
children, or other loved ones.75 
At the same time, immigration judges, asylum adjudicators, and 
attorneys, live in a violent world that diminishes sensitivity to 
persecution. Adjudicators and immigration judges listen to tragic 
stories of torture and physical persecution each day. It is most 
understandable that trying to compare levels of harm between 
applicants calls for great amounts of wisdom. But current events 
reveal an even greater insensitivity to violence by the state and its 
citizens in preserving order. Increasingly, cases of police brutality and 
torture force confessions from innocent persons in the United 
States.76 Police brutality knows no geographic boundaries.77 Nor 
 
 72. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat 272 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 73. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
 74. See generally id. 
 75. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is 
punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away form home, and family, and 
friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment; 
and that often times most severe and cruel.”). 
 76. John Conroy, Town Without Pity, CHICAGO READER, Jan. 12, 1996, at 14 (naming 
over fifty-nine women and men who were tortured, beaten, or physically abused by Chicago 
police officers over an eighteen year period.); JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY 
PEOPLE, THE DYNAMICS OF TORTURE (2000) (revealing the extensiveness of such 
government abuse by examining how ordinary people become torturers); see also Susan Bandes, 
Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1999). 
 77. Bandes, supra note 76, at 1276; see also Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture: United States of America, U.N. GAOR Comm. Against Torture, 
24th Sess., 424th, 427th, 431st mtgs., ¶¶ 175–80 (Concluding Observations/Comments), 
U.N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/ 
torturecomments.html (Committee’s concerns include, in part, “[t]he number of cases of 
police ill-treatment of civilians, and ill-treatment in prisons. . . . [a]lleged cases of sexual assault 
upon female detainees and prisoners by law enforcement officers and prison personnel. Female 
detainees and prisoners are also very often held in humiliating and degrading circumstances.”); 
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does there seem to be a limit to the human imagination and capacity 
to inflict harm and suffering upon another; it is stunning to find the 
similarities existing between occurrences of torture, whether in 
prison cells in Chicago or El Salvador.78 Former Illinois Governor 
Ryan, in pardoning four men on that state’s death row, described 
how police would force involuntary confessions by “bagging” 
defendants—placing plastic covers over the head to asphyxiate 
defendants until they talked, a technique also known in El Salvador 
as “la capucha.”79 Moreover, as police torture has come to light 
throughout the United States, Amnesty International reports that 
police have become more “sophisticated” by increasingly employing 
psychological torture—harming the victims but allegedly leaving no 
 
see also AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2001: UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (2001), available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webamrcountries/ 
UNITED+STATES+OF+AMERICA (“torture and ill-treatment were reported in prisons, jails 
and juvenile detention facilities. Abuses included beatings and excessive force; sexual 
misconduct; the misuse of electro-shock weapons and chemical sprays; and the cruel use of 
mechanical restraints, including holding prisoners for prolonged periods in four-point restraint 
as punishment.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports98/police/index.htm (presenting reports from fourteen United States cities from all 
parts of the nation documenting torture, severe beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment 
and stating, “Our investigation found that police brutality is persistent in all of these cities 
[and] that systems to deal with abuse have had similar failings in all the cities . . . .”). 
 78. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 1, 6, 15 (1997) (noting that the drafters of the Refugee Convention did 
not specifically define persecution due to their “awareness that the ingenuity of evil knows no 
predictable limits” (citing Atle Grahl-Madsen, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 193 (1966))). 
 79. Governor George H. Ryan, Address at the DePaul University College of Law 
(January 10, 2003) (summary on file with the DePaul University College of law). In his book, 
Conroy cites People v. Banks, 549 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), which noted that “we 
are seeing cases . . . involving punching, kicking and placing a plastic bag over a suspect’s head 
to obtain confessions.” CONROY, supra note 76 at 238. Using a hood to force asphyxiation 
was also a common practice in El Salvador. See also RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND 
DECEIT, U.S. POLICY AND EL SALVADOR 328, 350–53 (1984) (describing common torture 
practices in El Salvador: “One [practice] was to put a hood over the prisoner’s face, then throw 
lime inside ‘so when the person tries to breathe, they inhale lime,’ . . . . Electric shock was also 
common.”); Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1988) 
(providing a chilling description of torture by Salvadoran officials and finding that “persecution 
includes the following: arbitrary arrest, short term detention, torture including use of electric 
shock, capucha, beatings, rape, ‘disappearance’, extra-judicial executions, abductions, threats 
against family members, intimidation, forced ingestion of food, false imprisonment, 
mock-executions, sleep deprivation, mass killings, and forced relocations”). 
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tell-tale physical marks.80 Such violence by government agents is not 
limited to the local municipality or city. Human Rights Watch 
alleges that the United States government sends detainees from the 
Afghanistan War back to their native countries where interrogators, 
not bound by the United States’ Bill of Rights, use torture to extract 
information that will be helpful to the allies’ cause.81 If our 
governments so willingly trespass on human rights, how can we 
discern persecution abroad, or protect those fleeing persecution 
abroad? 
Blame cannot fall solely on government officials, for as Bandes 
suggests, no police brutality “could thrive without the complicity of 
the society [the] police serve.”82 More critical, all of us as citizens 
who know and condone such state-permitted violence share 
responsibility. As Conroy writes about the Chicago experience, 
“torture is something we abhor only when it is done to someone we 
like, preferably someone we like who lives in another country.”83 
 
 80. Edwin Dobb, False Confessions: Scaring Suspects to Death, AMNESTY NOW, Winter 
2002, http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/false_confessions.html. 
 81. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, United States: Reports of Torture of Al-Qaeda 
Suspects, Dec. 27, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/us1227.htm; 
Alan Cooperman, CIA Interrogation Under Fire; Human Rights Groups Say Techniques Could 
Be Torture, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2002, at A9 (“Human Rights Watch also objected to the 
alleged U.S. practice of turning over some captives for interrogation by countries such as 
Jordan, Egypt and Morocco, which have been criticized by the State Department for using 
torture.”); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Sources Reveal Tactics Used on Al-Qaeda 
Captives, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 2002, at 20 (“While the [U.S.] government publicly denounces 
the use of torture, each of the current national security officials interviewed defended the use 
of violence against captives as just and necessary. . . . ‘If you don’t violate someone’s human 
rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job,’ said one official who has 
supervised the capture and transfer of accused terrorists.”); Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation 
Challenged: Prisoner–U.S. Treatment of War Captives Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, 
at A12 (“[Amnesty International’s report] cites news reports that the United States has 
transferred dozens of prisoners from Afghanistan to Egypt, where, it says, they could be subject 
to torture during interrogation.”). The Pentagon has previously admitted that it had published 
and distributed training manuals for soldiers and military police in South and Central America 
that taught soldiers how to torture and execute citizen opponents. See Steven Lee Myers, U.S. 
Army Training Manuals; Be All That You Can Be: Your Future as an Extortionist, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 1996, § 4, at 7. 
 82. Bandes, supra note 76, at 1287–88. 
 83. CONROY, supra note 76, at 240. Conroy summarizes the dilemma in trying to stop 
such practices by stating that despite court proceedings documenting police torture: 
The citizens of Chicago were unmoved. The clergy showed no leadership; with the 
exception of a few mostly low-ranking ministers, religious officials were silent. In the 
absence of any clamor, politicians showed no interest. Reporters, hearing no 
complaint, conducted no investigations, and editorial writers launched no crusades. 
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Thus, advocating for refugees and adjudicating their claims becomes 
increasingly difficult in a culture that fails to eradicate this violence to 
maintain its own order.84 
IRFA’s impetus arose from the concern that protection for 
persons of faith or belief abroad had been neglected by the foreign 
nations and the United States.85 In addition to the neglect, bias, or 
lack of training perceived by Congress, the Smith and Elias-Zacarias 
decisions led to fewer religious liberty cases succeeding as both the 
Board and the lower courts upheld the difficult burden of proving 
religious persecution on account of general rules regarding military 
conscription.86 IRFA was a wake-up call because it requires the 
Departments of State and Justice, as well as the New Department of 
Homeland Security, to take claims of persecution on account of 
religion more seriously.87 Although initially many perceived IRFA as 
a clarion call by conservative U.S. Christians to protect Christians 
overseas, Congress instead stressed the universal and fundamental 
rights of belief and conscience and called upon adjudicators and 
judges to be trained in international protections of belief and religion 
 
State and federal prosecutors, feeling no pressure from the press or the public, 
hearing no moral commentary from the religious quarter, prosecuted no one. 
Judges, seeing no officer indicted and hearing no officer speak against his comrades, 
could therefore comfortably dismiss claims of torture, and with few exceptions, they 
did.  
Id. 
 84. John Conroy concludes his book describing the difficulty democracies face in 
prosecuting police and security officers for torture. The difficulties of prosecuting these cases, 
the denial of the torture, the minimization of abuse, the status of the victims, the diffusion of 
blame shared by so many in maintaining order, and perhaps even the confession that it was 
“effective or appropriate under the circumstances,” all make it difficult to eliminate torture 
completely. Id. at 242–56. 
 85. The House Report stated, “The primary impetus behind the immigration provisions 
of H.R. 2431 is the concern that victims of religious persecution may not be treated fairly by 
the organizations and individuals responsible for screening applicants for asylum or refugee 
status and adjudicating their claims. Such unfair treatment could arise from improper biases or 
from lack of proper training.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 3, at 16 (1998), reprinted in 1998 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 602, 628. 
 86. See, e.g., Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 87. Id.; see also INS ASYLUM OFFICERS BASIC TRAINING MANUAL: IMMIGRATION 
OFFICER ACADEMY 3 (Nov. 20, 2001) (“IRFA addressed perceived problems within our own 
system—specifically with the Department of State (DOS) and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) that may lead to diminished attention to the problems of religious 
persecution.”). 
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to reverse the trend of persecution.88 Given the mandate to reform 
asylum procedures, it remains surprising that no published asylum 
cases have cited IRFA.89 Although that training has commenced, the 
Training Manuals do not fully implement congressional intent.90 
Moreover, refugee advocates need to call upon these international 
protections in litigating asylum cases. 
IV. THE NEW PROTECTIONS OFFERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998 
To encourage recognition of these international protections, this 
article suggests at least four areas where exploration may lead to 
greater protection for refugees. First, IRFA suggests that religious 
claims have been neglected. Therefore by invoking international 
protections, IRFA recognizes that legal analysis of these claims is 
distinctive from the other enumerated grounds under the Refugee 
Act. Second, IRFA calls for greater sensitivity to the wide diversity of 
religion in credibility determinations. Third, IRFA expands the 
understanding of religious persecution, affording greater protection 
than has previously been granted. Finally, IRFA offers new legal 
arguments for those persons of faith or belief fleeing mob violence 
and civil strife. These are proposed as a means of meeting 
congressional concerns to eliminate the neglect or bias of past cases. 
A. Religion as Providing a Distinctive Remedy  
Under the Asylum Laws 
Congressional perception that freedom of religion and belief 
faced a renewed and increasing assault in many countries provided 
 
 88. Gunn, supra note 1, at 841. IRFA did not reflect the narrow support of a particular 
group, “but refers instead to the touchstone ‘international’ and ‘universal’ standards . . . as the 
guiding norms for IRFA.” Id. at 853. 
 89. The House Report stated, “The immigration provisions, as amended by the 
Committee, are intended to improve the processing of refugee and asylum claims based on 
religious persecution. . . .” See H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 3, at 16. 
 90. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., INS ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC 
TRAINING, IMMIGRATION OFFICER ACADEMY (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter INS TRAINING 
MANUAL] (stating that in addition to Asylum Officers and immigration judges, more than 
4,500 Immigration Inspectors and 2,500 Detention and Deportation Officers will receive 
training on IRFA’s mandates); see BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS AND FREEDOM REPORT 2002 app. D (2002), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/14090.htm. 
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the impetus for IRFA.91 Congress found that “[m]ore than one-half 
of the world’s population lives under regimes that severely restrict or 
prohibit the freedom of their citizens to study, believe, observe, and 
freely practice the religious faith of their choice.”92 To challenge 
other nations as well as the United States itself to redress these 
violations of religious liberty, Congress cited international 
declarations, covenants, and agreements protecting religion, belief, 
and conscience. IRFA mandates the consideration of international 
conventions and protections that recognize a broader protection for 
religion and belief than the religious liberty protections of the First 
Amendment.93 
Significantly, Article 2 of the Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief, acknowledges that neutral laws can improperly obstruct 
freedom of religion or belief. Article 2 states, in part, “the expression 
‘intolerance and discrimination based on religion and belief’ means 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion 
or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or 
impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.”94 Moreover, 
international agreements stress that due to the wide diversity of 
manifestations of belief (both religious and non-religious), 
protection for non-traditional claims is mandatory. International 
instruments protect both individual rights exercised alone or in 
 
 91. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(4) (2000); see Gunn, supra note 1, at 841. 
 92. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(4). 
 93. Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religions Freedom as a Universal Human Right: 
Examining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 2002 BYU L. REV. 217, 233 
(U.S. courts should examine religious liberty in “the broader context of a developing, 
collective world understanding.”); David Little, Does the Human Right to Freedom of 
Conscience, Religion, and Belief Have Special Status? 2001 BYU L. REV. 603, 604 (“As to the 
relation of religious freedom to other human rights, it seems clear that existing human rights 
documents and recent international jurisprudence do give the right to religious freedom a 
certain kind of special status.” (emphasis omitted)); Musalo, supra note 26, at 1215; see also 
INS TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 90 (“In the text of IRFA, Congress evokes the language 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaiming freedom of ‘thought, conscience, 
and religion’ in its findings. This notion of ‘religion’ as including an individual’s thought, 
conscience, beliefs, etc. allows for a broad interpretation of the protected ground in asylum 
applications.” (emphasis added)). 
 94. G.A. Res. 55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 
(1981) (emphasis added). 
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community with others.95 But before examining the specific ways 
IRFA can influence asylum adjudication, it must be asked whether 
Congress can single out religion for distinctive treatment in the 
INA’s asylum provisions. 
As Natan Lerner has noted, “Historically, the protection of 
religious freedom preceded the protection of other rights.”96 The 
Department of State in its May 2002 International Religious Liberty 
Report, concurs, calling religious liberty “one of those ‘unalienable 
rights’ . . . a right not granted by governments, but rather the 
birthright of every human being, in every nation and every 
culture.”97 Religion played an important role in the development of 
other human rights.98 The Office of International Religious Freedom 
began its work by naming religion and belief as a constitutive 
element of all other human rights.99 Strong historical evidence 
suggests that religious liberty is indeed this nation’s first liberty.100 
 
 95. ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF 
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 
60.XIV.2 (1960), reprinted in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS 18 (Tad 
Stanke & J. Paul Martin, eds., 1998). 
 96. Natan Lerner, The Nature and Minimum Standards of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
2000 BYU L. REV. 905, 908; See also W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of 
Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 71, 81 (1992); Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A 
Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 974 n.48 (1991). 
 97. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2002: INTRODUCTION (2002), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13607pf.htm. 
 98. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); MAX L. STACKHOUSE, CREEDS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A STUDY IN THREE CULTURES 58–65 (1984); see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: INTRODUCTION (1999), available at http:// 
www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_intro99.html [hereinafter 
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1999: INTRODUCTION] (“At the heart of universal human rights lies a 
powerful idea. It is the notion of human dignity—that every human being possesses an 
inherent and inviolable worth that transcends the authority of the State. Indeed, this idea is the 
engine of democracy itself.”). 
 99. ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1999: INTRODUCTION, supra note 98 (“Thus while religion 
can be a source of conflict, religious freedom—the right to pursue one’s faith without 
interference—can be a cornerstone of human dignity and of all human rights. To protect 
religious freedom is to protect a human endeavor that directly addresses the foundation of 
human dignity.”); see also MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FOUR 
INQUIRIES 11 (1998); GAMWELL, supra note 66, at 231. 
 100. THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM: THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICA 21 (2001) (“Free exercise of religion is an inalienable right reserved to the 
people—not a gift of government, but the sovereign right to be left alone, untroubled by any 
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Moreover, carving out distinct protection for religion or belief 
does not grant it a higher status in the pantheon of rights. Jeremy 
Gunn contests the critique that IRFA creates a hierarchy of rights by 
placing religion at the pinnacle. Instead, Gunn suggests that the 
neglect and diminution of religion required congressional action to 
bring the right of freedom of religion or belief back to a status 
comparable to that of other enumerated rights.101 Congress found 
that asylum adjudication had failed to protect freedom of belief or 
religion. Given the uncertainty of First Amendment protection, 
reliance upon international instruments was the only way to combat 
the neglect and diminution of protection. Through IRFA, Congress 
singled out religious liberty for distinctive protection, both 
internationally through the Department of State and domestically 
through reform of asylum law and procedure.102 Its call for reform of 
the asylum laws revealed a concern that bona fide refugees were 
being turned back to nations that would continue to persecute 
them.103 Congress, through IRFA, reunited asylum law with its 
international law roots. By initially incorporating the basic language 
of the Refugee Protocol into the INA, Congress brought U.S. 
immigration law into accord with international protections of 
refugees.104 This is especially critical because the BIA has held that 
Congress has incorporated international law into our domestic law in 
the INA itself. Therefore, adjudicators and judges must look to the 
INA, not international law, for assistance in deciphering eligibility 
for asylum relief. For example, neither immigration judges nor the 
 
incursions of the state into religious matters.”). The congressional findings assert that the 
nation’s founders “established in law, as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our Nation, the 
right to freedom of religion.” 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(1). Compare Gunn, supra note 1, at 846–
47 (stating that Congress intended the international rights instruments be the guiding norms 
instead of the more narrow separation of church and state model under the First Amendment), 
with DeCherf, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining that Congress is still uncertain of the 
ramifications of the Boerne case that held RFRA unconstitutional and is therefore hesitant to 
specify the First Amendment in IRFA). 
 101. Gunn, supra note 1, at 857. 
 102. Congress has often protected distinctive rights with different tests. See, e.g., Michael 
W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 31 (2000) 
(demonstrating that under the U.S. Constitution, we frequently single out different rights with 
different tests providing different levels of protection). 
 103. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-480, pt. 3, at 16 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
602, 628. 
 104. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 78, at 3; Blum, supra note 32; see also ANKER, supra note 
15, at 171–76. 
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BIA could provide relief based on the Geneva Convention or 
international customary law that protected war refugees.105 Thus, it 
has been difficult, if not impossible, to specifically employ 
international law principles in United States asylum proceedings.106 
International law, however, has had some influence on the 
development of asylum law.107 In fact, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugee’s Handbook for Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
provides “significant guidance,” but is not controlling in refugee 
adjudications.108 Lower courts have frequently ignored that guidance 
 
 105. In re Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734, 747 (BIA 1988) (“[N]either the Fourth 
Convention [the General Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War] nor customary international law provides potential relief from deportation that can be 
sought by individual aliens in deportation proceedings above and over that which is provided 
by the Immigration and Nationality Act, as implemented by regulation.”). The Board noted 
that Congress specifically contemplated and rejected legislation that might consider displaced 
persons as refugees under the 1980 Act. Id. at 740; see also Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 
918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“where a controlling executive or legislative act does exist, customary 
international law is inapplicable”); Am. Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 771 
(N.D. Cal. 1989). 
 106. See, e.g., Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in 
United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 1 (1992). 
 107. Deborah Anker has shown how principles of international law have brought new 
understanding to asylum adjudications as a gap filler in protecting claims based on gender—
because gender is not one of the five protected grounds. Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, 
Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133 (2002). The 
Immigration and Nationalization Service has also on occasion turned to international law for 
assistance in gap filling. See, e.g., Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., 
dissenting) (pointing out that the INS had relied on international law principles in drafting the 
Guidelines on Gender.). 
 108. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). More recently, however, the 
Court has downplayed the importance of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee’s 
Handbook (“UNHCR Handbook”) finding that it “provides some guidance in construing the 
provisions [added to the INA by the Refugee Act.” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 
427 (1999). One benefit of IRFA might be reclaiming the importance of the Handbook in 
asylum adjudication. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979), available at http://www.hrea.org/ 
learn/tutorials/refugees/Handbook/hbpart1.htm [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]. The 
UNHCR Handbook contains three paragraphs suggesting how to examine religious 
persecution: 
(c) Religion: 
71. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights Covenant 
proclaim the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which right 
includes the freedom of a person to change his religion and his freedom to manifest 
it in public or private, in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
72. Persecution for “reasons of religion” may assume various forms, e.g. prohibition 
of membership of a religious community, of worship in private or in public, of 
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by looking strictly to domestic law. IRFA reveals congressional intent 
to now use international agreements in the adjudication and 
protection of refugees fleeing violence against religion and belief.109 
Significantly, congressional enactment of IRFA opens new 
possibilities for engaging international law principles into 
adjudication of asylum applications from refugees fleeing religious 
persecution. 
IRFA’s concern about the INS and Department of State’s 
neglect of religious liberty and its perceived lack of protection of 
human rights was not the first time Congress had tinkered with the 
refugee definition over a perceived lack of protection for human 
rights. Prior to 1965, the Attorney General’s authority to withhold 
deportation, the United States equivalent of Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention, required the applicant to prove the probability of 
physical persecution.110 With the enactment of the 1965 INA, 
Congress deleted the adjective “physical” from the word 
persecution.111 Similarly, when Congress incorporated the Refugee 
Protocol definition of refugee into domestic law, it protected 
applicants who had been persecuted and those who had fled due to a 
well-founded fear of persecution.112 More recently, concerned that 
bona fide refugees were being denied asylum, Congress ensured 
protection for persons fleeing the Republic of China’s involuntary 
sterilization program who could prove persecution under that 
nation’s population planning program.113 IRFA now calls upon the 
 
religious instruction, or serious measures of discrimination imposed on persons 
because they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious community. 
73. Mere membership of a particular religious community will normally not be 
enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be special 
circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground. 
Id. 
 109. See Gunn, supra note 1, at 847. 
 110. Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 111. Id. at 105–06. 
 112. See ANKER, supra note 15, at 40 n.153 (Refugee Act definition includes past 
persecution and a well-founded fear of persecution, whereas the Convention’s definition “only 
refers to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution.’ See Convention . . . , art. 1(A)(2).”). 
 113. Congress amended the definition of refugee to include those fearing persecution on 
account of China’s one child policy: 
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a 
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be 
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who 
has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or 
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Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and State to cease 
neglecting those persons fleeing serious violations of religious liberty. 
Finally, the question might be raised whether Congress violated 
the Establishment Clause in enacting IRFA. Michael McConnell 
argues the Constitution does not violate its own Establishment 
Clause prohibitions when it singles out religion for distinctive 
treatment in the First Amendment nor does Congress when it seeks 
to protect religious liberty.114 Moreover, the majority opinion in the 
Smith decision specifically invited legislatures to carve out 
exemptions or protections for religious liberty.115 IRFA represents 
legislative protection of broader religious liberties than the First 
Amendment might protect.116 Thus, IRFA is an example of Congress 
 
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have 
a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). 
 114. McConnell, supra note 102. In addition to the text of the Constitution, McConnell 
also notes religion’s distinctive role in society encompasses many elements that call for different 
protections than for other human or civil rights—institutional, private, identity, locus of 
community and response to the “ultimate and transcendent questions.” Id. at 42; see also 
Laycock, supra note 67, at 316 (stating that the Constitution cannot decide whether religion is 
an idea or an identity: “religion plainly includes both”). 
 115. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889–90 
(1990). 
 116. Should IRFA be attacked on Establishment Clause grounds, the status of asylum 
applicants seeking entry into the United States should largely be a matter of congressional 
power to decide. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the plenary power of Congress 
to decide how to make decisions about entry of non-citizens into the United States. See 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (“Courts have long 
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised 
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”); Bridges v. 
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien 
seeking admission for the first time to these shores.”). Although the recent case of Zadvydas v. 
Davis raises questions regarding the current strength of the plenary power doctrine, the 
doctrine itself has not been overruled. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Moreover, the Zadvydas Court 
also stressed that the executive has great discretion in carrying out the laws enacted by 
Congress: “Ordinary principles of judicial review in this area recognize primary Executive 
Branch responsibility. They counsel judges to give expert agencies decision-making leeway in 
matters that invoke their expertise. They recognize Executive Branch primacy in foreign policy 
matters.” Id. at 700; see also Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375 (1st Cir. 2003) (“As an 
unadmitted alien present in the United States, Albathani’s due process rights are limited. See 
Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 . . . (1925) (presence in the country immaterial because 
excluded alien ‘was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in 
the United States’). As a result, many constitutional protections are unavailable to Albathani. 
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 . . . (2001); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rel. Mezei, 245 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it 
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.’)” (internal quotation omitted)). See 
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expanding the protection of those seeking refuge from persecution 
through its plenary power and the invitation of the Smith Court. 
B. Credibility Determinations 
Many asylum applicants lose their cases based upon negative 
credibility findings. Religious applicants face especially difficult 
burdens of demonstrating the sincerity or plausibility of the harm 
they face.117 IRFA calls for greater sensitivity to the wide diversity of 
belief and for greater understanding of the claims. Justice Robert 
Jackson penned some of the most poignant and powerful words ever 
written in the cause of protecting liberty of belief or religion: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are 
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us.118 
Yet asylum adjudications are fraught with credibility decisions of the 
applicant’s identity, religious identity, and the alleged persecution. 
Adjudicators and judges must make life or death decisions based on 
belief in the applicant’s testimony and supporting documentation. 
When the fact finder finds an individual not believable because she 
appears not to be of the faith or belief claimed, that decision raises 
serious First Amendment questions.119 
Requiring judges to peer into the heart of the professed believer 
is alien to the First Amendment. The Supreme Court dealt with this 
directly in a fifty-year old case, United States v. Ballard, in which the 
Ballards were criminally prosecuted for fraud based on claims that 
they had distributed literature and solicited money by means of false 
and fraudulent representations, pretenses, and promises.120 The trial 
court instructed the jury to consider only whether the Ballards were 
 
generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power, Immigration, Congress, and 
the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995). 
 117. See Samahon, supra note 29, at 2226. 
 118. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (footnote 
omitted). 
 119. See Samahon, supra note 29, at 2217, 2226. 
 120. 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944). 
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sincere in their beliefs.121 It ordered the jury not to consider whether 
their beliefs were true, for that would violate the First 
Amendment.122 But if they were not sincere, the court said the jury 
could find them guilty. Justice Douglas, in upholding the 
convictions, stated that the framers of the Constitution knew that 
the extreme views of diverse religious sects had frequently led to 
violence.123 The First Amendment prohibited the state from 
inquiring into a person’s relationship with his or her God. By 
recognizing one’s right to worship as one pleased, the government 
could not name the truth of his or her religious views.124 
But as Kent Greenawalt points out, although Douglas 
“eloquently evokes a tradition of religious liberty reaching the most 
unorthodox views, Douglas formally gives the unorthodox less 
protection.”125 Similarly, the First Amendment may “eloquently” set 
forth an aspiration of liberty, but during the last two hundred plus 
years, it has frequently failed to protect religious minorities and 
unorthodox beliefs or faiths.126 
Asylum cases pose significant problems in applying the Ballard 
sincerity test. As Justice Jackson concluded in his dissent, it is not 
easy, or even possible, to distinguish between sincerity and 
truthfulness.127 Judges have used their own personal knowledge to 
deny sincerity and truth because applicants have not been orthodox 
enough—a conclusion that both Barnette and Ballard enjoined.128 
 
 121. Id. at 81–82. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 87. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Greenawalt, supra note 71, at 203. 
 126. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 889–90 (1990); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A 
Mormon Response to Stanley Haverwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167, 171 (1992). 
 127. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1994) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 128. See, e.g., Mendoza v. INS, 28 Fed. Appx. 586, 587 (8th Cir. 2002) (BIA did not 
credit applicant’s testimony, in part, because he “lacked basic knowledge about Mormonism 
despite claiming to have belonged to the Mormon church, where his father was a 
minister . . . yet never attended a Mormon church here because he could not find one; and he 
managed to find and chose to attend a church of the Catholic faith, the faith of his alleged 
persecutors.”); Khanuja v. INS, 11 Fed. Appx. 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (applicant did not 
bear traditional earmarks of his faith); Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 724 (finding that 
applicant’s “willingness to swear under oath undermined his claimed that he was a Jehovah’s 
Witness. Based on his past experience with Jehovah’s Witnesses, the [immigration judge] took 
judicial notice that Jehovah’s Witnesses were prohibited from swearing under oath.”). Tuan 
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Moreover, as Justice Jackson predicted, prosecutions of persons for 
false religious statements “easily could degenerate into religious 
persecution.”129 
In the asylum context, IRFA blames those shortcomings, in part, 
on the failure to recognize the wide diversity and manifestations of 
belief.130 Among the international agreements raised up by IRFA, 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) protects the “freedom to change [one’s] religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest [one’s] religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship, and observance.”131 Article 18(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 
recognizes that “[e]veryone shall have the . . . freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching.”132 Both the UDHR and the CCPR stress the choice of the 
individual to adopt a religion and manifest that religion. Both 
recognize that individuals and communities change beliefs and 
manifest religion in non-traditional ways.133 Moreover, few 
individuals know all the rules of a belief or faith system, follow these 
rules consistently, or know the theological justifications. Conversion 
can occur in community worship, at a meal with friends, on a road to 
Damascus, at an upstate New York farm, or under any number of 
circumstances. Conversion may occur without education about all 
 
Samahon suggests it may even be a violation of the First Amendment for a judge to deny an 
asylum claim based on disbelief of an applicant’s claim to be a member of a faith tradition. See 
Samahon, supra note 29, at 2226. 
 129. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 130. See supra note 117–18. 
 131. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see also 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(3) (2000). 
 132. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 18, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ 
a_ccpr.htm; see also 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(3). 
 133. The United States religious experience has resulted in many new religious groups 
breaking away, evolving, and mingling with other religious experiences, constantly raising 
questions of what is orthodox—questions for believers to settle, not the courts. See, e.g., 
ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH 
SINCE WORLD WAR II (1988); MARTY, supra note 70, at 72–76. 
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the tenets of the faith.134 The extensive ways that religion and belief 
manifest themselves require all the greater sensitivity to judging 
credibility on traditional or limited understandings of orthodoxy. 
But decisions still must be made as to eligibility for asylum. As 
Fred Gedicks offers, when one is seeking a benefit from the 
government, some test of sincerity needs to be applied.135 Although 
asylum claims raise special urgency, both for the applicant as well as 
the nation, they are not without additional safeguards. Applicants 
who claim a fear of persecution if deported place themselves at risk if 
their claims are denied. In some cases, claiming a faith or belief may 
put them in greater danger if they lose their case than if deported 
without a public record of claiming to be part of a persecuted 
religious group.136 
The INS, in its training manual for asylum officers, reveals a 
certain sensitivity to these credibility issues and acknowledges that 
IRFA raises the bar from a previous lack of sensitivity.137 But the 
manual fails because it simply looks to Ballard’s First Amendment 
analysis rather than seeking illumination from IRFA’s guiding norms 
of international law. The INS still assumes that judges and 
adjudicators can accurately discern the difference between sincerity 
and truthfulness. IRFA suggests that judges have not accurately 
discerned in the past and calls for greater deference to the wide 
manifestations of belief, religion, and conscience. 
Asylum adjudications do not permit an easy answer to the 
sincerity problem.138 When one is seeking asylum, some test of 
sincerity needs to be applied.139 Any decision about relief based on 
whether the applicant is truly a Sikh, a Jehovah’s Witness, a 
Mormon, an atheist in a theocratic society, or any other 
 
 134. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715, 
(“Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 
‘struggling’ with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and 
precision that more sophisticated person might employ.”); see also Laycock, supra note 67, at 
334–36 (listing the many manifestations of faith understandings that would not pass muster 
under an orthodox test, but nevertheless, witness to a faith or belief that must be protected). 
 135. Gedicks, supra note 51, at 949–50. 
 136. See, e.g., Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the 
INS made no effort to conceal deportation, thus Christian convert faced death penalty because 
of apostasy upon return). 
 137. See INS TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 90. 
 138. Samahon, supra note 29, at 2226. 
 139. Gedicks, supra note 51, at 949–50; see also Greenawalt, supra note 71, at 204. 
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manifestation of the holy must be sensitively approached. IRFA calls 
for that sensitivity in its mandate for reform. 
IRFA’s concern that the wide manifestation of religions, beliefs, 
and non-beliefs be recognized suggests another way of looking at the 
problem. For example, the Board looks to whether fear is reasonable 
in light of the circumstances of the applicant’s state of mind.140 Given 
IRFA and the First Amendment’s prohibition in determining the 
truth or falseness of a religious belief, judges and adjudicators should 
first examine the claim as if the faith claim is true. First Amendment 
law suggests that the person or organization’s self-definition should 
control, absent clear evidence of fraud.141 Would someone in the 
applicant’s circumstances as a person of faith or belief possess a 
reasonable fear of persecution? If no, then the burden will not be 
met and asylum would be denied. If yes, then the fact finder can 
look into the sincerity of that belief, but only with the utmost 
caution under both the Constitution and IRFA and with sensitivity 
to the many manifestations of belief or faith. To help monitor error, 
the Board could adopt a balancing test as they have in a different 
situation in In re Pula.142 In that case, in light of strong negative 
discretionary factors, the Board held that a finding of a well-founded 
fear of persecution is an especially strong favorable discretionary 
factor that can overcome other negative discretionary factors.143 
Under IRFA, once persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
is found, an analysis similar to Pula’s should be employed. In 
examining the sincerity of the applicant’s faith or belief, the fact 
finder should balance the positive factor that persecution awaits if 
returned with the fact finder’s doubt about sincerity of belief. 
Moreover, IRFA now requires fact finders to explore the 
potential manifestations of faith or belief, the lack of formal training, 
and the impact of different cultures on an individual’s faith or belief 
before finding an individual not credible because of a lack of 
 
 140. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (BIA 1989); In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
439, 445 (BIA 1987); see also Bastanipour, 980 F.2d at 1133. 
 141. See, e.g., W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Elizabeth Sewell, Definition of Religion, in 
STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN CHURCHES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
STRUCTURES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (James A. Serritella ed., forthcoming 2003) (on file 
with the BYU Law Review). 
 142. In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987) (“[T]he danger or persecution 
should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of factors.”); accord In re Kasinga, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 347 (BIA 1996). 
 143. In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467. 
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symmetry with a traditional understanding of a particular faith or 
belief. Advocates representing applicants, moreover, need to 
understand how distinct manifestations of faith or belief may impact 
credibility and be prepared to rebut perceptions that an applicant’s 
departure from a perception of orthodoxy derails credibility. 
Undoubtedly, claims on account of religious persecution pose 
difficult credibility issues, but IRFA and its international norms offer 
aid to the applicant to at least explain the belief or faith that he or 
she holds. 
C. Persecution 
Distinguishing between persecution that makes one eligible for 
asylum and other forms of violence such as discrimination, 
harassment, civil strife, or random violence has remained one of the 
most difficult areas of asylum law in this nation. The world remains a 
very violent place. Courts have expressed concern that too generous 
a definition of persecution would flood the nations’ shores, 
administrative agencies, and courts with individuals who were victims 
of violence but not necessarily persecution.144 The INA and case law 
also suggest that two different standards exist for persecution 
depending on whether one is claiming relief based on past 
persecution or because of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.145 IRFA’s recognition of this nation’s failure to 
recognize bona fide refugees fleeing religious or faith-based 
persecution calls for all involved in the process to reevaluate how 
 
 144. See, e.g., Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 309, 403 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he statute was 
designed as a filter, and the mesh would be too broad if every foreign victim of discrimination 
in his homeland were eligible for asylum. There is discrimination even in the United States; 
many thousands of judicial and administrative claims are filed every year complaining of 
discrimination because of race, ethnicity, sex, or religion, and while many of the claims do not 
have merit many others do. There is much worse discrimination against minorities in many 
other countries. . . . The difference between persecution and discrimination is one of degree, 
which makes a hard and fast line difficult to draw.”). But this concern should be less relevant 
after IRFA. Congress found that more than half the world’s population suffered from 
violations of their rights of religion and belief. Moreover, Congress found that bona fide 
refugees fleeing violence on account of religion were denied asylum, and therefore, Congress 
enacted reform of asylum procedure. See supra note 84. 
 145. See In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 18–19; Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th 
Cir. 1991); Bucur, 109 F.3d at 405 (“[T]here is a double standard at work in asylum cases: if 
the applicant is not in danger of being persecuted if he is deported, he will not be granted 
asylum unless the persecution from which he fled was especially heinous.”); see 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(b)(1)(ii) (2002). 
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persecution is defined for persons seeking refuge based on their faith 
or belief. 
1. Defining persecution 
The wide diversity of violations against freedom of religion and 
belief suggest that IRFA can broaden protection for refugees by 
expanding the definition of persecution. Congress did not define 
persecution when it passed the Refugee Act of 1980.146 As discussed 
above, it has tinkered with how the United States will define 
persecution under its interpretation of the 1951 Convention and the 
Refugee Protocol.147 Congress left it to the BIA and the courts to 
define persecution. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Handbook (“UNHCR Handbook”) provides guidance 
stating that a “threat to life or liberty on account of . . . religion . . . 
is always persecution.”148 Generally, the courts have stated that any 
loss of life or liberty may be persecution although, in contrast to the 
Handbook, threats to life or liberty may not be sufficient.149 
As courts have struggled to specifically define persecution, these 
general conclusions have led different Circuit Courts of Appeal to 
describe the distinctive levels of harm necessary to qualify as 
persecution. The Ninth Circuit has held that “‘[p]ersecution’ means 
‘the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a 
way regarded as offensive.’”150 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has 
held that “‘[p]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our 
society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional.’ On the contrary, in order to be an act of 
persecution, the behavior in question must threaten death, 
imprisonment, or the infliction of substantial harm or suffering.”151 
 
 146. See, e.g., Bucur, 109 F.3d at 402; Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996); 
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 220 (BIA 1985). 
 147. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text; Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102 (9th 
Cir. 1969); In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 359, 360 (BIA 2002). 
 148. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 108, ¶ 51. 
 149. See Kovac, 407 F.2d at 107. 
 150. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (omission in 
original). 
 151. Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Zalega 
v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that persecution “encompass[es] more 
than just restrictions or threats to life or liberty” (alteration in original)). 
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Neither discrimination nor harassment constitutes persecution under 
those definitions.152 
Persons of faith or holding beliefs, for which they suffered, have 
had difficulties meeting their burdens of proof because violence 
against faith or belief may violate their conscience but fails to leave 
any physical scars. Crimes against the spirit or conscience may be 
harder to prove and harder to demonstrate than the equivalent harm 
of physical torture.153 IRFA does not specifically attempt to define 
persecution, but it does list both “[p]articularly severe violations of 
religious freedom”154 and “[v]iolations of religious freedom.”155 
 
 152. See, e.g., Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 309, 402 (7th Cir. 1997); UNHCR HANDBOOK, 
supra note 108; see also Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596(7th Cir. 2002); Regneantu v. 
Ashcroft, 248 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying claim as being, at most, mild harassment); 
Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir.) (“Persecution is an extreme concept, which 
ordinarily does not include ‘discrimination on the basis of race or religion, as morally 
reprehensive as it may be.’”). Significantly, however, the Handbook while agreeing that 
discrimination does not usually constitute persecution, states, “It is only in certain 
circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of 
discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person 
concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on . . . his right to practice his religion . . . .” UNHCR 
HANDBOOK, supra note 108, ¶ 54. 
 153. The Board has held that a persecutor need not prove subjective intent to constitute 
persecution. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996); see also In re C-Y-Z-, 21 
I. & N. Dec. 915, 924 (BIA 1997) (Rosenberg, concurring). These cases are especially helpful 
in areas of belief or religion where a party harming another may think that the intent is for the 
good of the one being harmed. 
 154. 22 U.S.C. § 6402(11) provides: 
The term “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” means systematic, 
ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, including violations such as— 
(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(B) prolonged detention without charges; 
(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine 
detention of those persons; or 
(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 
 155. 22 U.S.C. § 6402(13) provides: 
The term “violations of religious freedom” means violations of the internationally 
recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, as set forth 
in the international instruments referred to in section 6401(a)(2) of this title and as 
described in section 6401(a)(3) of this title, including violations such as— 
(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for— 
(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, 
and prayer, including arbitrary registration requirements; 
(ii) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs;  
(iii) changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation; 
(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or 
(v) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s 
choice; 
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Nonetheless, the congressional intent to rectify an apparent lack of 
concern for religious freedom and the need to reform asylum policy 
necessitates that adjudicators, judges, and attorneys pay specific 
attention to the kinds of violations that constitute persecution on 
account of religion.156 This problem is exacerbated when contrasting 
the obvious visible scars or disfigurement caused by physical torture 
against the invisible harm resulting from violence against the spirit 
when matters of faith or belief are attacked. Similarly, choosing not 
to follow a religious call or vocation if civil law, societal pressure, or 
punishment discourages manifestations of that faith or belief leaves 
little physical evidence. When combined with secular skepticism that 
compliance with civil law or societal pressure does not constitute 
harm, religious applicants face a difficult burden.157 Although 
Congress eliminated the necessity of proving “physical” persecution, 
the physicality of torture and violence and its ubiquity in many 
societies diminishes the perceived harm of other forms of 
persecution. Some courts have seemingly permitted an unwritten 
requirement of physical violence to seep into their decisions by 
denying claims based on persecution on account of religion.158 
IRFA does not distinguish between physical harm and harm to 
conscience or belief. Historically, religion has raised thorny issues in 
defining persecution. Roger Williams, a Baptist minister who 
 
(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual’s 
religious belief or practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous 
financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced 
religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, 
and execution. 
 156. Compare id. § 6401(a)(4) (listing the types of violations that appeared to go 
unremedied: “Among the many forms of such violations are state-sponsored slander 
campaigns, confiscations of property, surveillance by security police, including by special 
divisions of “religious police”, severe prohibitions against construction and repair of places of 
worship, denial of the right to assemble and relegation of religious communities to illegal 
status through arbitrary registration laws, prohibitions against the pursuit of education or 
public office, and prohibitions against publishing, distributing, or possessing religious literature 
and materials.”); with id. §§ 6402(11),(13) (listing the actual definitions of the two types of 
violations of religious liberty). 
 157. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Belkhos v. INS, 47 Fed. 
Appx. 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that one incident of electric shock standing alone 
constituted past persecution.). 
 158. See, e.g., Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir 1990); see also Wendy B. 
Davis & Angela D. Atchue, No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying a Safe Haven for Refugees, 
5 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 81, 111 (2000) (finding no cases where an applicant received asylum 
based on past persecution absent a finding of physical harm). 
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contributed to the development of colonial New England’s 
understanding of religious freedom, equated violation of conscience 
with physical rape.159 Judge Posner has attempted to divine the fine 
line, finding that “[i]f in fact the communist regime forbade 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to practice their religion, just as the Roman 
Empire until Constantine forbade Christians to practice their 
religion, that would be persecution; it is virtually the definition of 
religious persecution that the votaries of a religion are forbidden to 
practice it.”160 
By listing particularly severe violations of religious freedom and 
violations of religious freedom in the context of asylum reform and 
by recognizing that religious persecution was increasing worldwide, 
IRFA provides specific guidelines for examination of the facts of each 
case before cavalierly dismissing the harm as discrimination or mere 
harassment. The INS reads IRFA differently: 
[IRFA] does not effect the persecution analysis of an asylum 
adjudication in any way. Whether or not a particular violation of 
religious freedom (either particularly severe or not) could be 
considered persecution on account of religion depends upon the 
degree of harm imposed. Just because a particular type of harm 
appears in IRFA as a violation of religious freedom does not mean 
it rises to the level of persecution. Similarly, the omission from 
IRFA of a type of harm does not mean that it cannot amount to 
persecution.161 
IRFA implies the validity of the last sentence,162 but the INS 
interpretation sends the wrong message to adjudicators. True, the 
extent of the harm is often critical to a determination of 
persecution.163 But the INS statement that IRFA does not affect the 
 
 159. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT IN PERSECUTION FOR THE CAUSE OF 
CONSCIENCE 7 (Richard Groves ed., Mercer University 2001) (1867); see also MARK DE 
WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965). 
 160. Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 309, 405 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 161. See INS TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 90. 
 162. 22 U.S.C. § 6471 (2000) provides: 
The Annual Report, together with other relevant documentation, shall serve as a 
resource for immigration judges and consular, refugee, and asylum officers in cases 
involving claims of persecution on the grounds of religion. Absence of reference by 
the Annual Report to conditions described by the alien shall not constitute the sole 
grounds for a denial of the alien’s claim. 
 163. See ANKER, supra note 15. 
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analysis of persecution in “any way” ignores congressional concern 
that the INS was wrong in the past. The list alluded to in this section 
of the training manual includes torture, murder, execution, 
enslavement, rape, mutilation, and beating on account of religion or 
belief—all of which constitute persecution.164 What IRFA also adds, 
however, is to equate other arbitrary violations of liberty of belief, 
religion, or conscience as serious—and so should the asylum 
adjudicators, and judges. The listing of these violations together in 
the same list does impact adjudication and raises these violations of 
conscience and community as serious violations of great harm. The 
harm analysis does not disappear, but the fact finder needs to take 
more seriously the harm caused when an applicant offers evidence of 
any of the listed violations. 
Moreover, too often adjudicators and judges ignore that the 
personal fear of persecution is judged by a reasonableness standard of 
the applicant herself, not a secular judge or even a United States 
citizen.165 For example, the Board held in In re Mogharrabi, that the 
burden was upon the applicant to show that “a reasonable person in 
his circumstances would fear persecution.”166 IRFA recognizes that 
there is no single manifestation of belief or religion.167 Given the 
 
 164. Courts have found all of these violations of the person, standing alone or in 
conjunction with other violent acts persecution. See, e.g., Aron v. INS, 51 Fed. Appx. 254, 255 
(9th Cir. 2002) (beatings, lengthy incarceration and rape); Belkhos v. INS, 47 Fed. Appx. 405, 
409 (7th Cir. 2002) (torture); Alhori v. Ashcroft, 22 Fed. Appx. 737, 739 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(arrest and torture); Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2000) (physical violence and 
threats); Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (murder of uncle in context of 
other violence against family); Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Torture 
qualifies as persecution.”); Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (execution); 
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, Fisher v. 
INS, 73 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Persecution is stamped on every page of this record. 
Olimpia has been singled out to be bullied, beaten, injured, raped and enslaved.”); In re A-N- 
& R-M-M-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 953 (BIA 1999) (imprisonment and execution); In re C-Y-Z-, 21 
I. & N. Dec. 915, 917 (BIA 1997) (abortion and sterilization); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 
357, 361–62 (BIA 1996) (female genital mutilation); In re D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 78–79 
(BIA 1993) (rape and severe beating). 
 165. Recall Justice Jackson’s fear of unbelieving judges denying claims based on religious 
belief. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 166. 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987) (emphasis added); see also Chen v. INS, 195 
F.3d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n individual can demonstrate such a fear by showing that 
a reasonable person in like circumstances would fear persecution.”); Guevara Flores v. INS, 
786 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 167. In directing training for foreign service officials, including any member of the service 
who may assess requests for consideration for refugee admissions, IRFA mandates, “(1) 
instruction on the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion, the nature, activities, 
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wide variety of religions, beliefs, or other manifestations of faith, 
belief, or conscience, IRFA requires finders of fact to be more 
sensitive to the “reasonable person in his or her circumstances.”168 
IRFA, by listing psychological harms with physical harms like torture 
and beating, suggests that Congress did not mean to distinguish 
between harms.169 If asylum adjudicators and judges will not 
recognize that congressional intent, attorneys and representatives 
need to raise IRFA to fulfill Congress’s goal of remedying past bias 
against those fleeing violations of religious liberty. 
Applicants also need to present IRFA in cases given the history of 
persecuted minorities who must nonetheless survive in nations 
dedicated to eliminating their faith, their faith community, or what is 
perceived as heretical views to theocratic states. A sense has been 
creeping into asylum law that if one complies with a law or a custom, 
then the belief is not a core element of a faith tradition. Therefore, it 
is not persecution once the person complies with the law.170 The BIA 
provides yet another example. In In re Acosta, as it defined a 
particular social group, the BIA described an immutable 
characteristic defining a group as “one that the members of the 
group either cannot change, or should not be required to change 
because it is fundamental to their individual identities or 
consciences.”171 By posing the question as one of compliance, courts 
can ignore the Acosta test that individuals should not be forced to 
comply in violence to their faith or belief. Further, they can ignore 
 
and beliefs of different religions, and the various aspects and manifestations of violations of 
religions freedom.” 22 U.S.C.§ 4028(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 168. 8 U.S.C. §1158 (2000). 
 169. In In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), the Board stated, “We find 
the well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally, ‘of the same kind,’ to be 
most helpful in construing the phrase ‘membership in a particular social group.’ The doctrine 
holds that general words used in an enumeration with specific words should be construed in a 
manner consistent with the specific words.” IRFA lists specific words such as torture, 
enslavement, and beating with more general violations such as “arbitrary prohibitions on, 
restrictions of, or punishment for—speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs; changing one’s 
religious beliefs and affiliation; [or] possession and distribution of religious literature.” 22 
U.S.C. § 6402(13)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2000). 
 170. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that forced compliance 
with laws that are fundamentally abhorrent to a person’s deeply held convictions may 
constitute persecution, but acquiescence to those laws may provide evidence that such beliefs 
are not deeply held); see also Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that because petitioner complied with dress code laws and was still able to attend 
church and practice her faith, the dress code was not abhorrent to her deepest beliefs). 
 171. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (emphasis added). 
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IRFA’s findings that arbitrary restrictions, punishment, and forced 
conversions all constitute violations of religious freedom. 
In certain situations, persons of faith or conscience, may publicly 
deny their faith but still hold it deep within their very being. The 
history of religious persecution is replete with underground 
gatherings of faith from the catacombs of Rome,172 to African slaves 
singing spirituals hiding religious messages of resistance,173 to 
underground churches in China in the twentieth century,174 to name 
just a few. Persons of faith or belief have always had to discern how 
public to be with faith or belief in persecuting societies.175 To 
demonstrate compliance with laws on the outside while resisting in 
private is one way faith traditions survive. IRFA calls for 
consideration that such persecution, regardless of compliance, should 
be recognized and survivors protected.176 
 
 172. IVO LESBAUPIN, BLESSED ARE THE PERSECUTED: CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE, A.D. 64-313, at 55 (1987) (Christians when faced with the persecution by Rome 
debated strongly whether to just accept the punishment or continue in underground 
gatherings. Lesbaupin cites Clement that “Christians will not abandon their faith simply 
because it disturbs the oppressor, to be sure; but neither ought they add to further 
provocation . . . for this only occasions repression. . . . And so Christians ought not to expose 
themselves to danger. . . . They ought to follow certain norms of safety, lest they themselves 
provide the framework for their persecutors’ cruel acts.”). 
 173. KIM & REGGIE HARRIS, STEAL AWAY: SONGS OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 
(1984). 
 174. The 2002 International Religious Freedom Report notes that the Government of 
China, “closed underground mosques, temples, and seminaries, as well as some Catholic 
churches and Protestant ‘house churches’ . . . .” BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
& LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS AND FREEDOM REPORT 2002: 
CHINA (INCLUDES HONG KONG AND MACAU) (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13870.htm. 
 175. See Mousin, supra note 38, at 114–15. See also BAU, supra note 35, at 26–27 
(stating that in the United States, refugees working with religious congregations that engaged 
in resistance through the sanctuary movement often had to choose between “public sanctuary” 
and “quiet” refuge). 
 176. As Jeremy Gunn also notes, the increased emphasis on religious persecution and the 
administrative structures set up in the Department of State make the Annual Religious 
Freedom Reports superior to the Department’s Annual Country Reports on human rights. 
These added resources should make it easier to prove persecution with this more detailed 
evidence. See Gunn, supra note 11. The Board and the courts already give great deference to 
State Department Reports. See, e.g., In re G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 369 (BIA 2002); see also 
22 U.S.C. § 6471 (2000). 
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2. Past persecution 
Although the Refugee Act of 1980 modified the 1951 
Convention’s protection by adding the word “persecuted” to the 
well-founded fear of persecution requirement in the definition of 
refugee, cases did not consider past persecution until 1989 when the 
Board held in In re Chen that “it is clear from the plain language of 
the statute that past persecution can be the basis for a persecution 
claim.”177 The Board recognized in those situations where there was 
little likelihood of future persecution, the Attorney General still had 
the authority to deny asylum as a matter of discretion.178 Because 
asylum is a discretionary remedy, the Board determined it did not 
further the humanitarian goals of asylum to grant asylum if the 
applicant could return to his or her native land if no future threat 
existed. The Board held, however, that past persecution established a 
rebuttable presumption of similar persecution in the future, thus 
meeting the applicant’s burden of a well-founded fear of 
persecution.179 For example, in In re Chen, the Board noted that 
“there may be cases where the favorable exercise of discretion is 
warranted for humanitarian reasons even if there is little likelihood of 
future persecution. . . . It is frequently recognized that a person 
who—or whose family—has suffered under atrocious forms of 
persecution should not be expected to repatriate.”180 The Board 
went on to note that if the evidence in the record revealed that 
country conditions had so fundamentally changed that the applicant 
had no future fear, the claim could be denied. Applying these tests, 
however, have made it difficult for persons of faith or belief to prevail 
in asylum cases. 
 
 177. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (BIA 1989). For another perspective, compare 
the Refugee Convention’s, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 15, language of 
“well-founded” fear with the INA’s “persecuted or well-founded fear of persecution,” INS 
TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 90. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Desir v. Ilchert, 
840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988), had previously recognized that right for all cases arising 
within its jurisdiction. See also ANKER, supra note 15. 
 178. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 18. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 19. The Attorney General has since codified this holding in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.13(b)(1) (2002). See also In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 346–47 (BIA 1996); In re N-
M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312 (BIA 1998). 
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 a. The Holocaust problem. Although Chen called for case-by-case 
adjudication in past persecution claims, the standards prior to IRFA 
have been extremely high. As one court stated: 
The experience of persecution may so sear a person with distressing 
associations with his native country that it would be inhumane to 
force him to return there, even though he is in no danger of further 
persecution. Very few of the surviving German Jews returned to 
Germany after the destruction of the Nazi regime, and it would 
have been cruel to force them to do so on the ground that bygones 
are bygones. In such cases the attempted rebuttal fails in lesser 
cases of past persecution and perhaps even in the most serious cases 
if the persecuted group has become the ruling group, deportation 
may not be inhumane.181 
No doubt the court was correct with regards to the suffering of the 
Jews, but to suggest that “in lesser cases” than the Holocaust, 
deportation may not be inhumane ignores the ongoing cruelty of 
torture. 
For example, in Kumar v. INS, a Fijian woman was stripped and 
fondled by soldiers in her home.182 On one occasion soldiers beat her 
unconscious after she witnessed them enter her temple, smash 
religious statutes, and burn a holy text and then hauled her out of 
her temple and ordered her at gunpoint to convert from Hinduism 
to Christianity.183 She had also witnessed her parents beaten and 
incarcerated.184 The Immigration Judge denied her case, holding that 
changed country conditions reduced her future fear and the violence 
she suffered was not so “egregious” as to warrant asylum.185 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the violence did not rise to the 
 
 181. Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit has stated 
this test most starkly, but other circuits have noted the high burden this places on asylum 
applicants who depend solely on proof of past persecution. See, e.g., Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 
F.3d 460, 463 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The quantum of persecution he experienced would not ‘so 
sear a person with distressing associations with his native country that it would be inhumane to 
force him to return there, even though he is in no danger of future persecution.’ Baka v. INS, 
963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 
1991).”). 
 182. 204 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 183. Id. at 933. 
 184. Id. at 932–33. 
 185. Id. 
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level suffered in Chen, and therefore, she did not “warrant a special 
dispensation of humanitarian relief.”186 
Courts face the difficulty of discerning whether past persecution 
has been atrocious or heinous. Judge Posner confessed some 
hesitation in deciphering the “oxymoron” of “mild persecution” in 
deciding whether past persecution is severe enough to qualify an 
individual for a grant even with little likelihood of future 
persecution.187 Although IRFA does not define violations of religious 
freedom as coinciding with persecution, IRFA’s linking of physical 
with spiritual types of violations calls for judges and adjudicators to 
be more acute in understanding the extent of harm imposed on 
persons of faith or belief. Moreover, Congress enacted IRFA because 
it found many situations of “heinous” violations of religious liberty 
were not remedied, thus strengthening arguments that these types of 
harm deserve recognition as valid claims for asylum.188 In addition, 
the more detailed reports and work of the Commission should 
provide attorneys and judges with new sources of evidence 
documenting the extent of harm when considering past persecution 
cases. 
 b. The forgotten test of the mind of the refugee. Given the very 
high burden once the evidence in the record demonstrates that 
country conditions have changed, cases rarely discuss the personal 
pain suffered by the refugee in his or her unique circumstances. The 
Board in Chen, when holding that atrocious past persecution alone 
might be sufficient for relief, noted two factors besides changed 
country conditions, stating, “even though there may have been a 
change of regime in his country, this may not always produce a 
complete change in the attitude of the population, nor, in view of his 
 
 186. Id. at 935. Nine months later, however, in another Indo-Fijian case, the Ninth 
Circuit recognized its earlier prediction that country conditions had changed for the better 
proved wrong, suggesting it may have been too quick to find a fundamental change in denying 
Ms. Kumar’s case. In Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645,647–48 (9th Cir. 2000), the court 
recognized that despite sending Ms. Kumar home, “in the past several months conditions in 
country have deteriorated to their lowest point in 13 years.” 
 187. Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 1997). Although the court found that a 
Jehovah’s Witness had been, “beaten, starved and tortured,” it determined that he only 
suffered “mild persecution” and, and therefore, did not deserve of asylum relief based on past 
persecution. Id. at 404, 406. 
 188. Congress found “Though not confined to a particular region or regime, religious 
persecution is often particularly widespread, systematic, and heinous under totalitarian 
governments and in countries with militant, politicized religious majorities.” 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6401(a)(6) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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past experiences, in the mind of the refugee.”189 By simply looking at 
the change in country conditions, courts have failed to fully examine 
the mind of the refugee or, for that matter, the attitude of the 
population.190 The Board in Chen was also not establishing an 
impossibly high standard that would require asylum applicants to 
show persecution equivalent to that of the Holocaust, nor did it 
 
 189. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989). 
 190. But see In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 347 (“Central to a discretionary finding in 
past persecution cases should be careful attention to compelling, humanitarian considerations 
that would be involved if the refugee were to be forced to return to a country where he or she 
was persecuted in the past.”). The Board and courts may also be too quick to applaud the 
ameliorative impact of a regime change. Little noticed in the facts surrounding the Chen case 
was the Board’s comment that, “However, it is also true that, since the time of the Cultural 
Revolution, conditions in China have changed significantly. We note in this regard that 
millions of people suffered during the Cultural Revolution and have since been 
rehabilitated. . . . While religious freedom as we understand it may still not be enjoyed in 
China, we are not persuaded by the evidence presented that a reasonable person in the 
respondent’s circumstances would have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his 
religion, if returned to the China of 1989.” In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 20–21. The 
Board’s decision in In re Chen was handed down on April 25, 1989. Id.  
China’s pro-democracy protests began in Beijing in April 1989 and the massacres at 
Tiananmen Square occurred on June 4, 1989, only thirty-nine days after the Chen decision. See 
AMNESTY INT’L, TIANAMEN—11 YEARS ON AND STILL NO GOVERNMENT INQUIRY 
“FORGOTTEN PRISONERS” (May 1, 2000), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/ 
index/ENGASA170172000. Amnesty also noted that as of the May 2000 report, 213 persons 
were still imprisoned or on medical parole since their activities during the Tiananmen Square 
events. Id. The Board’s confidence of its understanding of human rights issues in China as 
articulated in Chen should stand as a tragic warning before rushing to find no future fear of 
persecution should an applicant be repatriated. Indeed, the 2002 International Religious 
Freedom Report for China reports that, “The Government continued to restrict religious 
practice to government-sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship, and to 
control the growth and scope of activity of religious groups . . . .” BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS AND 
FREEDOM REPORT 2002: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13608.htm [hereinafter RELIGIOUS AND 
FREEDOM REPORT 2002: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has recognized it may have acted to quickly in finding 
country conditions changed, to the potential harm of a Indo-Fijian woman. In Gafoor v. INS, 
231 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2000), the court reversed the BIA’s denial of asylum to a Fijian of 
Indian descent on November 3, 2000. It recognized that barely nine months earlier, it had 
denied asylum to a Indo-Fijian woman because it had agreed with the BIA that despite past 
persecution, changed country conditions eliminated any future fear of persecution. Id. at 647. 
It now found that “the underlying racial tension between ethnic and Indo-Fijians has persisted, 
and in the past several months conditions in the country have deteriorated to their lowest point 
in 13 years.” Id.; see also Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1011(9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on 
other grounds, 268 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (Indo-Fijian eligible for asylum based on past 
persecution). 
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delineate the exact circumstances of eligibility, but rather emphasized 
that it “can best be handled on a case-by-case basis.”191 
IRFA’s concern with a faulty asylum procedure and the 
discussion of the types of harm persons of faith, belief, or conscience 
face provide new legal arguments for rebutting the restrictive 
standards under Chen and Skalak. The particularly severe types of 
torture listed by IRFA present guidelines as to the nature of past 
persecution that should be considered for relief. Congress has not 
distinguished between the harms caused by restrictions and 
punishment of conscience and rape, beatings, and other physical 
punishment. When considering the harm done by past persecution, 
IRFA calls for a more careful examination of whether the record 
involves these types of violations of liberty on account of religion, 
belief, or conscience listed by IRFA.192 
Finally, by relying on international instruments as a source of 
protection for religion, belief, or conscience, IRFA forces all those 
involved in the protection of bona fide refugees to understand the 
distinctive nature of persecution on account of religion or belief. 
Whether courts are willing to adopt Roger William’s claims that 
violations of conscience are tantamount to physical rape, physical and 
mental abuse on account of religion such as that abuse Ms. Kumar 
suffered nonetheless meets IRFA’s concerns and should be sufficient 
to obtain asylum on past persecution alone.193 The IRFA’s mandate 
 
 191. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. at 22; see also Lal, 255 F.3d at 1088 (“the proper approach 
to the humanitarian exception was to determine whether the petitioner’s persecution was 
roughly comparable to Chen’s . . . without applying a mechanical ‘minimum showing of 
‘atrocity.’’”(citations omitted)). 
 192. Moreover, much like how quick courts have been to find changed country 
conditions, they have been too quick to minimize the long-term harm of physical or 
psychological torture. The Chicago Tribune reported that many Holocaust survivors who are 
now senior citizens are now having painful recall of the persecution they suffered fifty years 
ago, making it difficult for caregivers to treat them or even realize the intensity of the pain and 
suffering they currently experience. One eighty-nine-year-old nursing home resident with 
Alzheimer disease “relives the horror of the Holocaust as though it were happening now. . . . 
Their minds can no longer keep buried the tortured memories of concentration camps, gas 
chambers and loved ones killed before their eyes.” Tom McCann, Nightmare World Holocaust 
Survivors with Alzheimer’s Can Suffer Flashbacks of Old Horrors. Nursing Homes Are Learning 
How to Help Them, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 2003, at N1. Likewise, many of the violations of 
religious freedom cited by IRFA have long-term effects that cannot be lightly forgotten or 
buried in the mind. 
 193. Kumar v. INS, 204 F.3d 931, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Hernandez-Montiel 
v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing medical studies that find that “rape 
commonly results in severe and long-lasting psychological sequelae that are complex and 
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to understand how religion is manifested and how extensive the 
persecution is combined with Chen’s emphasis on also examining the 
mind of the refugee provides a powerful combination. This powerful 
combination should force all those concerned with meeting our 
commitment to protecting bona fide refugees to reconsider the 
Skalak test for past persecution as tantamount to proving one 
suffered similarly to survivors of the Holocaust. 
c. Changed country conditions. The persistence of religious 
persecution throughout the globe, both in geography and in time, 
suggests caution before finding that country conditions have 
changed so significantly that a refugee does not face a fear of 
persecution upon her return.194 The Office of International Freedom 
has identified at least five categories into which countries that 
persecute persons of faith, belief, or conscience fit: (1) totalitarian or 
authoritarian attempts to control religious belief or practice; (2) state 
hostility toward minority or non-approved religions; (3) state neglect 
of the problem of discrimination against, or persecution of, minority 
or non-approved religions; (4) discriminatory legislation or policies 
disadvantaging certain religions; and (5) stigmatization of certain 
religions by wrongfully associating them with dangerous “cults” or 
“sects.195 As an initial point, each of these categories call for different 
types of proof to demonstrate a nexus to one of the protected 
refugee grounds, but at the very least, they each suggest state 
involvement in persecution or neglect in remedying the violations. 
The State Department’s annual reports will be most helpful when 
applicants seek evidence about a nation listed in one of the five 
categories. The third category may prove most helpful in asylum 
cases involving state neglect or failure to protect minority religions as 
 
shaped by the particular cultural context in which the rape occurs. . . . Longer-term effects can 
include persistent fears, avoidance of situations that trigger memories of the violation, 
profound feelings of shame, difficulty remembering events, intrusive thoughts of the abuse, 
decreased ability to respond to life generally, and difficulty reestablishing intimate 
relationships.”). 
 194. Congress found, “Though not confined to a particular region or regime, religious 
persecution is often particularly widespread, systematic, and heinous under totalitarian 
governments and in countries with militant, politicized religious majorities.” 22 U.S.C. 
§ 6401(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
 195. RELIGIOUS AND FREEDOM REPORT 2002: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 190; 
see also Michael Young, Keynote Speech at BYU Ninth Annual International Law and Religion 
Symposium (Oct. 9, 2002) (transcript available from the BYU International Center for Law 
and Religion Studies). 
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it calls to mind the Board’s concern in Chen that even with changed 
conditions in the regime, persecution can continue through mob 
violence or civil strife, further exacerbating the fear in the mind of 
the refugee.196 When combined with the Office’s designation of 
countries of particular concern, advocates will have additional 
evidence to meet an applicant’s burden of proof.197 
 D. Affirmative Duty to Protect 
Finally, IRFA’s invocation of international guidelines addresses 
another problem area involving civil strife. Divining when an 
individual, a family, or a community of faith are being singled out for 
persecution instead of being victims of civil strife or random violence 
has also plagued asylum adjudications involving religious claims.198 
United States asylum law does not offer refuge for those persons 
fleeing civil strife or random violence. As the Board noted in In re 
Acosta, persecution “does not embrace harm arising out of civil strife 
or anarchy.”199 The Board reviewed legislative history where 
Congress considered and then refused to adopt a definition of 
refugee that included protection for displaced persons who were 
forced to flee from military or civil violence.200 Subsequent cases have 
also held that human rights abuses alone do not qualify an applicant 
for refuge status.201 Gaining asylum based on persecution on account 
 
 196. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19. 
 197. IRFA calls for the Office of International Freedom to designate “countries of 
particular concern” where it finds particularly severe violations of freedom of religion or belief. 
22 U.S.C. § 6412(b)(1)(A)–(B); see also Gunn, supra note 1, at 844. In a forthcoming law 
review article on persecution on account of gender, Karen Musalo argues persuasively that a 
new test of “harm plus lack of state protection” provides nexus for gender persecution. See 
Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2003). A similar argument in religion cases might be particularly effective 
especially for persons fleeing countries of particular concern. 
 198. See, e.g., Rostomian v. INS, 210 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (denied asylum 
based on random violence during period of significant strife); Bradvica v. INS, 128 F.3d 1009, 
1013 (7th Cir. 1997); Rusu v. INS, No. 96-3832, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21539, at *2 (7th 
Cir. Aug. 7, 1997) (finding that asylum law does not turn isolated beatings or interrogations 
into a right to remain, “if they did, then no one could be deported, given widespread private 
prejudice and civil strife”). 
 199. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 22 (BIA 1985). 
 200. Id. at 223 & n.10. 
 201. In re T-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 571, 576 (BIA 1992) (“It also appears indisputable that 
human rights abuses occur on a large scale. This does not mean, however, that these abuses, 
standing alone, translate into persecution as defined in the Act.”); see also Bradvica, 128 F.3d 
at 1013 (generalized civil strife insufficient to support a claim for asylum). 
MOU-FIN 5/31/2003 1:22 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
588 
of religion has been particularly burdensome because of the difficulty 
of distinguishing between civil strife and persecution on account of 
religion.202 In addition to the legal grounds, courts have expressed a 
policy concern that too generous a standard for persecution would 
open the floodgates to millions of asylum seekers. For example, in 
Rusu v. INS, the court denied asylum despite beatings that the 
applicant sustained by Securitate after conversion to Pentecostal 
faith. The court further found that after a regime change in 
Romania, the threat by private actors to burn down the family house 
if the family continued to distribute Bibles was not sufficient and the 
court denied asylum because “the immigration laws do not turn 
isolated events of this kind into a right to remain in the United 
States; if they did, then no one could be deported, given widespread 
private prejudice and civil strife.”203 
Tragically, Congress found that much of the world suffers 
religious violence and enacted IRFA to order the State Department 
and the President to challenge such practices. Congress also voiced 
concern that religious persecution is especially abhorrent when either 
“national security forces” or “hostile mobs” engage in religiously-
 
 202. Bradvica, 128 F.3d at 1013; Petrovic v. INS, 198 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“It is well settled that general, oppressive conditions that affect the entire population of a 
country do not provide a basis for asylum. . . . [T]his principle has been interpreted to mean 
that fear of general conditions of ethnic persecution common to all members of an ethnic 
minority does not constitute the well-founded fear required by statute.” (citations omitted)); 
Rostomian, 210 F.3d 1088; Rusu v. INS, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21539, at *2–3. 
 203. 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21539, at *2. There has always been tension in the 
relationship between these holdings and the federal regulation that permits proof of pattern 
and practice against similarly situated persons. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A)–(B) (2002): 
In evaluating whether the applicant has sustained the burden of proving that he or 
she has a well-founded fear of persecution, the asylum officer or immigration judge 
shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that there is a reasonable 
possibility he or she would be singled out individually for persecution if: 
 (A) The applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her 
country of nationality or, if stateless, in his or her country of last habitual 
residence, of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the 
applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion; and 
(B) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and identification 
with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon 
return is reasonable. 
IRFA’s findings and the annual reports should be most helpful in meeting the regulations 
burden or proof and avoiding dismissal as just random violence or civil strife. 
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motivated violence.204 Congress, moreover, cited the need for IRFA 
to challenge and solve the problem of “renewed” and “increasing” 
assaults by both government-sponsored and government-tolerated 
violations of religious freedom.205 Congress also ordered this nation 
to reform its asylum laws and procedures to protect refugees fleeing 
such violence.206 
IRFA recognizes the internationally agreed upon responsibility of 
government to protect against those violations.207 With the 
introduction of international instruments such as the UDHR, 
especially Article 18, attorneys, adjudicators, and judges must 
reevaluate how to analyze claims for asylum on account of religion 
when dealing with civil strife issues. As Arcot Krishnaswami pointed 
out, several Articles of the UDHR establish an affirmative duty for 
the state to protect religious minorities: Article 7 places a duty upon 
public authorities to protect individuals and groups against 
discrimination;208 and Article 18 imposes upon signatories an 
affirmative duty of protecting religious minorities from mob violence 
or private vengeance on account of religion.209 IRFA also points to 
the CPPR, which the United States Senate ratified in 1992.210 As 
Gerald Neuman points out, “[t]he obligations of states-parties to the 
CCPR are not merely negative. Under CCPR Article 2, each agrees 
‘to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes . . . to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
 
 204. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(5) (2000). Sadly, these congressional findings relate nothing 
new. Lesbaupin points out that even the persecutions of early Christians by the Romans began 
not from government, but from the people. He writes,  
The emperors of the first two centuries did not initiate general persecutions. The 
earliest persecutions were the outcome of local movements and limited popular 
initiative, with the approval, merely, of the magistracy. It was the people who called 
for persecution, frequently engaging in it themselves and rendering it more cruel, 
and incessantly provoking the hostility of the emperors and the magistrates against 
Christians. 
LESBAUPIN, supra note 172, at 7. 
 205. 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(4). 
 206. Id. §§ 6401(a)(4), 4028(a)–(b) (2000) (training of foreign service officers, 
including those making overseas refugee determinations); id. § 6473 (2000) (reform of asylum 
procedures). 
 207. Id. § 6401(a)(3) provides in part: “Governments have the responsibility to protect 
the fundamental rights of their citizens and to pursue justice for all.” 
 208. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 95. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 
41–42 (1997). 
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necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.’”211 Both the UDHR and the CCPR, therefore, place an 
affirmative duty upon the government to protect religious minorities, 
especially in places of civil strife.212 If governments fail to protect, the 
resulting harm should meet an applicant’s burden for asylum after 
IRFA. 
Moreover, even if courts refuse to interpret IRFA as making any 
fundamental changes in domestic asylum law, these international 
agreements bind the nations where the alleged persecution occurs. 
The violations of religious liberty cannot be explained away as civil 
strife because the nation has a duty to protect individuals and 
communities from that very violence. Karen Musalo has argued that, 
especially in cases of persecution on account of gender, serious harm 
plus neglect by the state to protect from that harm suffices to prove a 
nexus for purposes of United States asylum law.213 IRFA calls nations 
to live up to those international obligations that establish this duty of 
protection against violence on account of religion, belief, or 
conscience. Moreover, if the Office of International Freedom finds 
that the nation in question falls into category three, this provides 
additional evidence of state responsibility to cure the violence. Thus, 
in cases where it is impossible to prove a state actor persecuted an 
asylum applicant on account of religion due to civil strife or random 
violence, IRFA, both through its international instruments and its 
reporting and investigations, provides all who are concerned about 
rectifying violence against persons of faith, belief, or conscience or 
the communities they belong to with new tools to challenge these 
cases which deny relief based on civil strife or random violence. 
 
 211. Id. at 41 (omission in original). 
 212. Such protection may take many forms whether legislative or judicial. In the United 
States, after the Supreme Court upheld the requirement of all public school students to stand 
and state the pledge of allegiance to the flag each day in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940), persecution against Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to recite the 
pledge resulted in beatings and expulsions from many towns around the nation. See DAVID R. 
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR, THE FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY 163–86 (1962). Just 
three years later, the Court reversed itself and exempted persons of conscience from having to 
recite the pledge. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The violence 
against the Jehovah’s Witnesses after the Minersville case prompted the Court, in part, to 
revisit and overturn its earlier decision. MANWARING, supra, at 201–02. Reform of asylum law 
could provide a similar resource in protecting persons fleeing violations of religious liberty. 
 213. Musalo, supra note 197. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Critics have denounced IRFA as one more example of the 
United States attempting to impose its will and its laws upon the 
world. Defenders argue that IRFA only calls the nations of the world 
to live up to their agreements found in international covenants and 
declarations. Both sides in the debate, however, have neglected to 
acknowledge that IRFA calls upon the United States to live up to 
these very same agreements in adjudicating asylum applications based 
on persecution on account of religion. Although the INS has 
commenced the mandated training of officers, there is little evidence 
that it has grasped the full implications of engaging these 
international instruments as guiding norms in adjudication. 
This article sets forth four areas of domestic asylum law that can 
provide increased protection to refugees fleeing persecution on 
account of religion or belief by introducing the legal issues that the 
international instruments bring to each case. IRFA also provides a 
second legal argument, should the Board and the courts not fully 
incorporate these international instruments into domestic asylum 
law. This second legal argument suggests that the Board and the 
courts should analyze whether foreign nations have met their 
respective obligations in protecting belief, religion, and conscience to 
the extent that they have agreed to be bound to by these 
international agreements. A nation’s refusal or inability to protect 
victims of violence on account of religion, falls short of the 
protection they agreed to under these international instruments, thus 
contributing to the evidence of persecution on account of religion. 
Advocates have a duty to employ these international provisions in 
challenging the biases and neglect that have diminished the 
protection in religious persecution cases. 
International law principles, however, provide no panacea to 
solving violations of religious liberty. History has shown that 
notwithstanding asylum law’s international law roots and the 
developing protections against persecution, United States domestic 
asylum law has been slow in recognizing these remedies. In addition, 
countries have frequently argued for exemptions from their 
obligations. But given congressional intent to reform asylum law, 
IRFA calls upon the United States to do no less than it asks of other 
nations. Having pledged to protect religion, belief, and conscience, 
the United States should adjudicate asylum claims pursuant to the 
broader international understanding of liberty of religion and belief 
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so that those fleeing violations of liberty of belief or religion gain 
refugee status. Only then will Congress be able to fulfill its intent for 
this nation to foster liberty and stand with the persecuted. 
 
